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Abstract 
For over a century the UK has experienced relative long-term economic decline, 
as evidenced by its disproportionate loss of world trade and slow growth rate 
when compared to Germany and other OECD economies. This thesis examines 
whether sterling overvaluation has been the cause of this decline and the UK’s 
current economic dilemma. 
Thirlwall, (2011) wrote: 
‘foreign exchange is a major constraint on the growth performance of many 
poor countries and that with improved export performance and a lower 
income elasticity of demand for imports, they would grow much faster.’ 
Would a more competitive pound relieve the UK of a balance of payments 
constraint or would it cause inflation, depress living standards and leave structural 
problems unaddressed? 
The thesis analyses the pro and anti-devaluation arguments. The pro-devaluation 
demand-side argument rests on the supposition that UK economic policy has long 
favoured finance over industry causing sterling to be overvalued, arguably since 
its original    overvaluation in 17111. This has drawn investment and human capital 
away from manufacturing which in turn exacerbates supply-side deficiencies. 
The UK’s long-term trade deficit on goods has been financed through a 
combination of a surplus on invisibles and a reliance on income from overseas 
assets. In this decade net income streams have turned negative leaving the UK 
dependent on foreign direct investment and further sell-offs of UK assets both at 
home and abroad. 
The thesis argues that this is unsatisfactory because:  
1. In the short and medium-term it creates unemployment and a hugely 
unequal and polarised society. 
2. In the long run it is unsustainable, as when there are insufficient assets left 
to sell, the inevitable unplanned exchange rate crash will occur. 
                                                          
1 In 1711 Newton, as Master of the Mint, reluctantly valued sterling at £3 17sh 6d to the ounce 
of gold; see page 93 for concluding summary on this theme. 
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The thesis finds that overvaluation causes a lack of investment in those parts of 
the economy where productivity increases are readily achieved and a lack 
demand which induces either deflation or the unsustainable substitution of private 
debt. When private debt creation slows, this induces a rise in government debt. 
Without a competitive currency, the UK faces a balance of payments constraint 
or a burgeoning and unsustainable debt burden. This exacerbates inequality and 
risks the breakdown of consensual politics. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This thesis adopts the premise, espoused by Jeff Powell,2 that ‘the particular 
should be examined within the totality and that one should be wary of mono-
causal explanations’. In line with Post-Keynesian insights, it regards economies 
as path-dependent organisms where bank creation of money and debt profoundly 
affects outcomes. 
Heterodox economists suggest recent western economic woes are exacerbated 
by: 
1. Wage suppression in countries which have wage-led aggregate demand 
(as per Lavoie, M., and Stockhammer, E. 2012). 
2. The burden of debt imposed by the increased financialisaton of the 
neoliberal era, in which industry serves banking instead of banking serving 
industry (Table 1 Appendix 1). 
This thesis proposes a third cause, that of overvalued currencies.   
Overvaluation impacts on policies of wage-led reflation.  Raising wages in an 
open economy such as the UK hits exports and thereby reduces domestic 
demand as consumers choose imports over domestic products; domestic 
production consequently faces lay-offs or shut down. This can induce 
governments to unwittingly encourage household debt as a substitute for wage 
and export demand. 
Similarly, while the City loads the UK economy with private debt, the foreign 
currency it draws in to the UK via asset and bond sales, props up an overvalued 
pound. 
Each Chapter will progress the argument as follows: 
Chapter 2, the Literature Review, first lays out key concepts within the thesis: the 
importance of manufacturing, the Balance of Payments Constraint (BPC), the 
                                                          
2 Greenwich University 11th May 2017 12.00 -13.45 Queen Anne court room QA20 Marxist theory of 
financialization 
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Marshall-Lerner Condition and aspects of exchange rate determination. It then 
summarises the anti-devaluation and pro-devaluation arguments. 
Chapter 3 scrutinises the arguments. It provides historical evidence that 
devaluations need not cause inflation.  It highlights the significance of the 
difference between average unit labour costs (ULCs) of all goods and the ULCs 
of internationally traded manufactures. It suggests that studies finding the 
Marshall-Lerner condition does not hold ignore the non-linearity of price elasticity 
of demand. Finally, it analyses why Exchange Rate Pass-Through (ERPT) can 
be so low. 
Chapter 4 shows how the exchange rate impacts on exporting firms’ profitability. 
It counters key objections to devaluation.  
Chapter 5 defines overvaluation and looks at the socio-economic consequences 
of allowing invisibles and capital flows to dominate the UK exchange rate. It 
explains why trade flows have always played a subordinate role in determining 
sterling’s value. 
Chapter 6 provides heuristics for determining the level of devaluation needed to 
set the UK on a sustainable path of economic growth, eliminating the balance of 
payment constraint and excessive private and public debt. It then draws together 
some macroeconomic conclusions. 
 
2       Literature review 
This review starts by introducing the historic debate around manufacturing, the 
Balance of Payments Constraint (BPC) and the Marshall-Lerner condition; it then 
reviews the anti-devaluation and pro-devaluation arguments.  
2.1   The Balance of Payments Constraint (BPC) 
This thesis contends that manufacturing has always been the driver of rising living 
standards, that manufactures are price sensitive and that exchange rates 
determine whether an economy’s manufactured goods are competitive.  If they 
are, a healthy manufacturing sector enables economies to grow quickly and 
sustainably through path dependent growth; if they are not, growth leads to rising 
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trade deficits imposing a BPC on the economy.  If devaluation caused 
commensurate inflation, after nominal devaluations price rises would leave the 
real exchange rate unaltered, so economic policy would have to concentrate 
solely on supply-side solutions to escape the BPC.   
In the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods era, countries with trade deficits had to 
part with gold and could not run up deficits indefinitely. The tension for the UK 
was between achieving economic growth on the one hand and keeping the deficit 
to manageable proportions on the other. Whenever the economy expanded too 
fast, imports rose faster than exports: the UK’s marginal propensity to import was 
too high. Thirlwall and Gibson (1992) regard this as a ‘structural problem’ and 
assert that growth must therefore be suitably contained. After World War Two this 
led to the notorious ‘stop-go’ years. Whenever growth increased, the balance of 
payments would deteriorate and the government would ‘slam on the brakes’, a 
policy reversal that induced deflation.  
Thirlwall (1979) hit upon a simple but powerful formula for explaining the 
equilibrium growth rate of any economy, christened ‘Thirwall’s Law’. He regarded 
this as a dynamic version of Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier. Thirlwall (2011, 
p.10) alludes to ‘…forty years’ evidence that since 1971 exchange rate changes 
are not an efficient balance of payments adjustment weapon. Currencies 
appreciate and depreciate and still massive imbalances remain.’ 
His law is: 
1) yB* = E(Z)/π 
where, yB* = growth rate of income 
E = income elasticity of demand for exports 
Z = world income 
π = income elasticity of demand for imports. 
The weaker version is: 
2) yB** = x/π,  
where X = export growth. 
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Thirlwall (2001) states it is changes in expenditure and output, not price changes, 
that equilibrate an economy, in line with Post-Keynesian thinking that supply and 
demand imbalances are equilibrated by changes in quantity rather than price.   
He deduces that the UK has a structural supply-side problem. If growth is to be 
maintained in balance of payments equilibrium, then the marginal propensity to 
import is the key factor. The lower it is, the less the BPC and the faster an 
economy can grow, and vice versa. 
Dr John McCombie, (1993), summarising Thirlwall, emphasises that if an 
economy faces a BPC, borrowing to finance it cannot go on for ever as eventually 
(he suggests this is when the government debt to GDP ratio is over 50%) lenders 
get nervous. This rejects the supposition of Modern Monetary Theorists (Randal-
Wray, L. 2012 and Mosler, W. 2010) that deficits are irrelevant when foreigners 
are happy to buy a country’s debt denominated in its own currency.  
Depreciation is rejected because it causes inflation which prevents gains in 
competitiveness and leaves supply-side issues unaddressed. 
2.2 The Marshall-Lerner Condition 
Opposing the above supply-side analysis is the theory that export and import 
volumes are driven by price, i.e.  tradeable goods are price elastic. When 
devaluation causes export prices to fall, volumes will increase, and as import 
prices rise, import volumes will decrease. The Marshall-Lerner condition, the 
neoclassical metric for determining whether devaluation will reduce a trade 
deficit, is that export and import price elasticities must sum to greater than one. If 
so, a combination of the positive increase in net export volume and fall in import 
volume, will more than fully offset the rise in import prices and the fall in unit 
export prices.  
Thirlwall (Ibid,) concedes that if a ‘deterioration in the terms of trade is more than 
offset by a reduced volume of imports and increased volume of exports, then 
devaluation would address a trade deficit. He and McCombie argue that for the 
UK, price elasticities are too low for this to occur. The UK needs supply-side 
remedies, not devaluation. 
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2.3 Exchange Rate Determination     
Neoclassical exchange rate models assume nominal exchange rates are 
determined by flows of supply and demand for goods and services.  Exports raise 
demand and the currency’s price, and imports vice versa. If another country’s 
prices of traded goods are cheaper this induces extra demand for them, while in 
the home country, higher prices reduce demand. The price of the respective 
currencies therefore shifts to equilibrate prices. This currency adjustment 
removes the price differential between the countries so that the Law of One Price 
(LOP) and Purchasing Power Parity hold, at least in the long run. Unfortunately 
for all these models, the evidence is that the LOP does not hold, except 
occasionally and perhaps in the very long run, Harvey (2010, p.15 and p. 29 and 
throughout). 
Neoclassical models assume that financial flows and capital movements follow 
movements in trade; they regard money as white noise facilitating trade flows. 
Heterodox economists also assume that nominal exchange rates are determined 
by flows of supply and demand, but have capital flows as dominant; they 
emphasise the importance of currency traders’ expectations in determining short 
term flows and consequent fluctuation in currency prices.  
 
These flows are independent of trade, based on the empirical record as examined 
by John Harvey (Ibid, p.64.). Harvey (Ibid, p.7) notes: 
 
‘although trade flows (the real sector) can impact the currency price, the 
far larger and more volatile movements of short-term capital take center 
stage in today’s economy. They are cause and not effect….’ 
 
This explains why the UK has been able to run a trade deficit since 1985. This is 
explored in Chapter 5. 
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2.4   Six Hypotheses Opposing Devaluation 
To oppose devaluation ‘supply-side economists’ employ six interrelated 
arguments.  
The first asserts that devaluation causes inflation due to the increase in price of 
imports and imported inputs, which prevents increased price competitiveness, as 
summarised by Nam, S-W. and Kim, S-J. (1999, p. 251):  
‘Devaluation is believed to have no lasting effect because inflation 
accelerates such that the relative price of domestic goods tends to return 
to the predevaluation level.’ 
Like the pro-devaluation case, it relies on price being the driver of export and 
import volumes.  
The second argument is that for the UK, traded goods are not price sensitive; it 
is non-price factors that count.  
The third closely related argument dismisses devaluation as a tool for eliminating 
trade deficits, on the empirical basis that countries with trade surpluses tend to 
have appreciating currencies. 
The fourth hypothesis is that undervaluation in fact worsens BOP problems, first 
by encouraging excess home demand which attracts more imports at higher 
prices and secondly, by an ‘ossification effect’ (Thirlwall and Gibson 1992, 
Preface and pp. 355-356). The latter proposes that prices do drive net exports in 
the short run; however, by prolonging the life of inefficient firms, devaluation 
weakens the balance of trade (BOT) in the long-run. 
The fifth argument is that for the UK the Marshal-Lerner condition does not hold 
due to the low price-elasticities and high income-elasticities of UK exports and 
imports respectively. 
The sixth argument is a catch-all hypothesis that devaluation is irrelevant as a 
policy tool because governments cannot control exchange rates. They are 
determined by market forces. 
The next sections flesh out these arguments. 
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2.4.1 Devaluation Causes Inflation 
Thirlwall and Gibson (Ibid, p. 241) support the inflation argument and believe 
competition in world markets and/or domestic price inflation erodes any gain in 
competitiveness.  This assumes, contrary to their other arguments, that prices 
are a relevant metric; Appendix 2 quotes such assertions from their book. 
Depreciation raises import prices fuelling inflation.  Export growth thus fails to 
materialise and consumers face falling living standards.  
However, they did not fully analyse the inflationary process, which is examined in 
Chapter 3.6.      
2.4.2   Non-price factors determine the Balance of Trade (BOT) 
Switching tack, Thirlwall and Gibson assert that devaluation cannot work because 
UK costs and prices have little bearing on exports. Focussing on the BOP crisis 
prior to the 1967 devaluation, they assert that the UK’s wage costs played no part 
in making the UK uncompetitive: they cite MacGeehan (1968) who found that 
from 1960 to1965 ULCs grew more slowly in the UK than in the rest of Europe. 
They also cite Ray (1966) who shows that from 1958 to 1964 UK wage costs per 
unit of output rose 11%, compared with 12% in Japan and Italy, and 22% in West 
Germany. In other words, UK price competitiveness did not deteriorate. Ray (Ibid, 
pp. 21-22) shows the UK had the lowest hourly wages of all industrial countries 
in 1964. From this Thirlwall & Gibson, and Ashcroft (1996) deduce that reducing 
costs, if this were possible through devaluation, would not aid the BOT.  
They provide extensive empirical studies showing that the price elasticity of 
demand for UK exports is too low for the Marshall-Lerner condition to be met.  
When demand increases in foreign economies they look elsewhere for imports. 
After the heavy depreciation of sterling in the 1970s exports rose less than the 
growth in overseas economies, while imports failed to contract. They infer it is the 
nature of the products on offer, not their price, that affects the BOT; they quote 
qualitative research analysing which non-price factors are to blame.3  
                                                          
3 For a contemporary analysis of German non-price competitiveness see Storm and Naastepad, 2014. 
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We subdivide their non-price factors into four broad categories.  
(i) Market share/geographical share hypotheses claim the economy is 
producing goods which are not in sufficient demand or are aimed at the 
wrong markets. This is the unfavourable market-wrong product 
argument. 
(ii) Poor quality: goods are poorly designed, have the wrong function or 
are unreliable. They may also suffer from poor after sales service and 
poor marketing. 
(iii) Management: UK companies are badly managed; they have poor 
human capital. 
(iv) Lack of capacity holds back exports and domestic substitution of 
imports. This argument finds that investment is too low and may be 
combined with a lack of investment in R&D.  As a result, the economy’s 
aggregate ICOR4* is too high, i.e. its inverse/reciprocal, the SRRC5, 
too low. 
The evidence they collate, (Appendix 3, Parts A & B) broadly rejects (i), but 
supports the other three categories. Having severely indicted UK manufacturing 
for these supply-side weaknesses, the authors proceed to the notorious Kaldor 
Paradox, that the BOT has a positive correlation with exchange rate movements.  
2.4.3 The BOT has a positive correlation with exchange rate movements 
In this third argument, Thirlwall and Gibson (Ibid, p.75) point out that Triffin (1978) 
and Kaldor (1978) show that the correlation between the BOT and currency 
appreciation appears to have the wrong sign and thus refutes the pro-devaluation 
solution.  
Five surplus countries, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Holland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg increased their surpluses from 1972 to 1977, as their currencies 
appreciated, while the deficit countries of US, Canada, UK, Italy and France 
                                                          
4 * ICOR = Incremental capital to output ratio: lower equals better.  
5 The return to an individual investor is lower than the return to the economy as whole, the latter being 
the Social Rate of Return on Capital (SRoR). This includes all the multiplier effects throughout the whole 
economy which are triggered by the initial investment. 
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increased their deficits while their currencies depreciated. They note that 
reductions in trade deficits correlate with currency appreciation, and vice versa. 
They surmise that good supply-side policies raise productivity and exports, 
thereby facilitating trade surpluses. 
Likewise, Ashcroft (2010), points to the long-term decline of sterling and asserts: 
‘If devaluation was (sic) a cure for the British Economy, the UK should be 
one of the strongest economies in the Western world. After all, in 1980 the 
exchange rate against the dollar was $2.20 compared to $1.45 today. In 
1945 the Dollar Exchange rate was $4.03’. 
Figures 2A and 2B illustrate his point. 
Figure 2 A: Sterling’s Decline against the US Dollar. 1 Jan. 1953 to 12 Dec. 2017 
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Figure 2 B: Sterling’s Decline Against the Deutschmark 1st Jan 1953 – 12th Dec. 2017 
 
Source: http://fxtop.com/en/historical-exchange-
rates.php?A=1&C1=GBP&C2=DEM&DD1=01&MM1=01&YYYY1=1953&B=1&P=&I=1&DD2=13&MM2=12
&YYYY2=2017&btnOK=Go%21     (Accessed 14th December 2017). 
2.4.4 Undervaluation worsens BOT problems 
In the fourth argument Thirlwall and Gibson (1992, p.237) state that devaluation 
worsens balance of payments problems, by citing Harrod (1968a, 1969 b): ‘the 
source of the United Kingdom’s difficulties was not an overvalued pound, but an 
undervalued pound causing excess demand at home.’ 
With an undervalued currency and insufficient demand restraint, the economy 
continues to suck in imports rendered more expensive by devaluation. Supply-
side weaknesses prevent import substitution, so the BOT worsens. 
To reinforce this argument, they present an ‘Ossification Effect’ theory. 
Depreciation gives a temporary reprieve to older poor-quality export products. 
This reduces incentives to produce newer and better-quality products that would 
address the trade deficit. In support, they cite Brech and Stout (1981). They 
constructed a trading up and trading down index for 40 categories of goods in the 
UK machine tool sector. Between 1970 and 1980 they found that depreciation 
correlated with trading down, i.e. the substitution of low for high unit value goods.  
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They conclude that the UK responds slowly for structural and institutional 
reasons to market or technological changes and that depreciation just temporarily 
prolongs the life of obsolete products (Ibid, p. 355).  
2.4.5 The Marshall-Lerner Condition is not met 
Ashcroft (1996) endorses Thirlwall and Gibson’s scepticism about the UK’s ability 
to meet the Marshall Lerner condition. His estimates show that ‘demand 
coefficients are dominant’.  Exports are relatively price inelastic, while imports are 
so price inelastic that there is hardly any substitution effect. However, exports 
and imports are income elastic, being sensitive to external and domestic demand 
respectively. 
He allows that when economies were less open, in the 1960s and 70s, price 
elasticities may have summed to well above unity, unlike in the 80s and 90s. He 
quotes evidence (Ibid, p. 214) from Bean (1991) that even when Marshall-Lerner 
conditions were supposedly met, the attempts to expand the economy in 1953, 
1959, and 1963, resulted in increased output and sales but a worsening BOT. 
Thereafter he detects a gradual reduction in price elasticity of demand:  
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Table 2   Declining UK Price Elasticities 
Source: Tables 1, 2 & 3 in Ashcroft (1996, p.234-235) on Diminishing Price Elasticity of Demand for UK 
Exports and Imports over the decades. 
He cites Ball, Burns and Laury (1977) who went further, reporting no significant 
relationship between relative price and demand for imported goods. 
Ashcroft (Ibid, pp. 214-216) argues that in the 50s, 60s and 70s the stop-go 
policies caused by the UK balance of payments constraint, had a ratchet effect 
with the result that every ‘go’ was less successful than the last. ‘Increases in 
import penetration on the upswings were not matched by equivalent decreases 
in the downturn’ (Ibid, p215). This led to increasing capacity problems and to 
manufacturing being increasingly dependent on imported inputs.  
Import substitution was too weak to address the BOT problem. 
Ashcroft (Ibid, pp.246-256) references numerous inconclusive studies that 
address this question in the 1980s. Capacity emerges as the key factor. He 
concludes (Ibid, p. 255) that ‘manufacturing output is dominated by changes in 
domestic demand or income rather than changes in price competitiveness’. We 
interpret these findings in Chapter 3.  
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2.4.6 Governments cannot control exchange rates 
This sixth anti-devaluation argument simply states that Governments cannot 
control exchange rates, as they are determined by market forces.  
Government intervention will either come to nought or do harm. Markets see what 
the government is doing and react. In so doing the ‘underlying equilibrium’ of an 
economy will reassert itself and any structural problems will persist. The market 
knows best on everything, including exchange rates. This is scrutinised in 
Chapter 2.6.8. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Thirlwall and Gibson (1992. Preface p. x), summarise their case categorically:      
‘The problem cannot be tackled by exchange rate depreciation or 
monetary manipulation. It requires real economic policies of a structural 
nature related to the wider characteristics of goods, such as their quality, 
design, reliability, marketing and delivery.’   
2.6 The Pro-Devaluation Case 
The pro-devaluation case argues that devaluations relieve BOT problems and 
increase growth and real wages. It rests on seven interrelated hypotheses: first, 
productivity growth depends on economic growth rather than vice versa; 
secondly, manufacturing  and technology are the source of growth; third, firms 
face flat or falling cost curves;  fourth, services cannot offset manufacturing 
deficits; fifth,  devaluation causes little inflation, exchange rate pass-through 
(ERPT) being low; sixth,  the price elasticity of exports and imports fulfils the 
Marshall-Lerner condition; seventh,  countries do successfully target their 
exchange rates to ensure competitiveness and thereby grow their economies and 
raise living standards.  
2.6.1 Growth drives Productivity 
Verdoorn’s Law describes a simple long-run relation between productivity and 
output growth, such that   p = a +bQ, where p is the labour productivity growth, Q 
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the output growth (value-added), b is the Verdoorn coefficient and a is the 
exogenous productivity growth rate. 
Rather than explaining productivity growth by the progress of knowledge in 
science and technology, as in neoclassical models such as Solow’s, Verdoorn's 
law assumes path-dependent cumulative causation, in which demand drives 
output; increased output causes increasing returns thereby augmenting the rate 
of accumulation. 
Kaldor and Thirlwall realised that an expanding export sector facilitates 
specialisation in the production of export products; learning- by-doing increases 
the level of skills in the export sector, creating a virtuous circle of demand-led 
growth feeding rising productivity. This reallocates resources from the less 
efficient non-trade sector to the more productive export sector, and lowers the 
price of traded goods. 
Export demand is potentially far greater than domestic demand alone, and growth 
in manufacturing, which we evidence later is invariably where productivity 
increases occur6, is therefore essential for output growth. Increased growth is the 
prime cause of increasing productivity, so export demand, which requires a 
competitive currency, is therefore key.    
The exchange rate featured in economic debate from the First World War on, as 
Schenk, (1994 & 2010) bears witness. Prior to the 1980s many OECD 
governments accepted that an overvalued currency encourages unemployment, 
trade deficits and slow growth. Hence in 1975, the European Community decided 
not to allow the Swiss Franc to join the European Snake fearing its strength would 
put upward pressure on Common Market currencies, thereby weakening their 
trade balances with the ROW, (Hudson 2005, p.p. 90 to 100.). Nevertheless, 
since c. 1980, UK governments have moved from fretting about the trade deficit 
to ignoring it, leaving exchange rates to ‘the market’.   
 
                                                          
6 ‘faster growth in manufacturing will create faster growth overall’ Lavoie, 2014, p.528 
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2.6.2   Manufacturing and productivity 
We turn now to a crucial assumption of the pro-devaluation export-led growth 
case. This is that manufacturing has always been, and remains, the sector of the 
economy where productivity increases can most easily occur. 
History shows that it is only since the industrial revolution, when technology 
began to replace or supplement human labour, that productivity significantly 
increased (Table 3). 
Table 3  
 
Source: (Table 1-3 in Maddison 2013 p.28) 
As Angus Maddison’s website notes: 
‘Over the past millennium, world population rose 22–fold. Per capita 
income increased 13–fold, world GDP nearly 300–fold. This contrasts 
sharply with the preceding millennium, when world population grew by 
only a sixth, and there was no advance in per capita income.’  (Source: 
The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm, 2013 version.) 
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The adaptability of the human mind, touted to support the contention that 
productivity can rise faster in services than manufacturing, also increases 
manufacturing productivity, as technical innovation passes through into the 
production process.  
ONS figures show that output per worker in manufacturing is well above the 
average. For example, in 2012, the average number of people employed in 
manufacturing was 2,552k. Gross Value Added in manufacturing was 
£147,702bn, so average value added per employee was £57,877, whereas for 
the whole economy it was £42,705, (total GVA £129.9bn/total workforce of 
30,416k). 
Table 4, (Source John Mills, 2016, derived from sources stated) shows that from 
1997 to 2015 manufacturing, despite declining to only 9.7% of GDP, contributed 
27.9% to the increase in GVA. 
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Table 4   Manufacturing Productivity UK 1997-2015 
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What is the source of growth? The Romans straddled the UK with straight roads 
and Cicero wrote philosophy second to none. And Cicero’s waiter brought food 
to the table little slower than a waiter today. Yet the latter has a TV, mobile phone 
and health care. Services see little direct increase in productivity but in the 
technology and manufacturing sector, the combination of energy, machinery and 
technology dramatically increases the ratio of output to inputs. In parts of the 
service sector where technology is employed, output increases, but increased 
output per head originates in manufacturing and technology.  However, if we did 
not pay today’s waiter enough to enjoy at least some of this increased output, 
there would be no waiters.  Hence those whose productivity has not increased 
much over hundreds of years, benefit from the rise in productivity despite not 
contributing to it. This explains the data in Table 4.  
It is equally vital to understand that large scale infrastructure spending has a long 
pay-back time and the return on capital is usually merely in-line with interest rates. 
It is industry, particularly light industry where the introduction of new plant and 
new technology can be done quickly, that brings greater and more rapid returns 
on investment. As per ‘Kaldor-Verdoorn’, it is not just the returns to individual 
investors that count: the speed of money circulation can rise due to the knock-on 
effects of higher wages and higher employment. This can bring about very large 
returns to the economy in aggregate.  The s (the reciprocal of the ICOR) can be 
higher than 50%.  A competitive exchange rate unlocks these potential returns. 
2.6.3 The myth of rising cost curves 
The anti-devaluation case is buttressed by the neoclassical concept of rising 
marginal costs. If firms faced rising marginal costs, then increasing output would 
be inflationary but in recessions, firms cut back production creating underutilised 
capacity and a consequent output gap. Firms can then expand production by 
utilising this unused capacity. Neoclassical economists therefore conclude that it 
is only in recessionary times that average costs can remain constant or fall as 
output increases.  
In normal times, they assert, firms face rising marginal costs, so extra demand 
raises prices, thereby reducing any increase in price competitiveness.  
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With rising cost curves companies could restrain costs and increase exports only 
by holding their production constant and switching from domestic to export sales.  
To facilitate this government must dampen domestic demand to absorb the 
inflationary pressure. Indeed, after the 1981 UK recession the large decrease in 
domestic demand induced a trade surplus. While depressing domestic demand 
may address a trade deficit, it shrinks the economy and reduces living standards, 
ceteris paribus, at least in the short run.  
However, empirical research predominantly by Post-Keynesian economists 
shows conclusively that the vast majority of firms do not face rising cost curves. 
Manufacturing can    expand without inflationary consequences in normal non-
recessionary times. 
The myth of rising marginal costs is exposed by Blinder (1988) and Lavoie (2009 
& 2014) who draw on the work of Downward (1995) and Eiteman &Guthrie 
(1952).  
Downward found that 63% of businesses disagreed that costs and output 
increase together while 64% agreed that costs decreased as output increased, 
and 72.5% agreed that price competition is stronger than non-price competition. 
Lavoie (Ibid,) quotes Eiteman and Guthrie’s findings: 
‘Only 18 companies out of 366 picked curves that support the neoclassical 
theory. If we look at the costs of producing individual products, only 62 out 
of 1082 picked products conform with rising average costs.’ They 
conclude, ‘the replies demonstrate a clear preference of business men for 
curves which do not offer great support to the argument of marginal 
theorists’ (Eiteman and Guthrie 1952: p. 838)’.7 
Keen, S. (2013, p.126) quotes Blinder’s summary of his findings, which were 
clearly not expected by Blinder:  
‘Firms report having very high fixed costs – roughly 40 percent of total 
costs on average. And many more companies state that they have falling, 
rather than rising, marginal cost curves. While there are reasons to wonder 
whether respondents interpreted these questions about costs correctly, 
                                                          
7  Businesses reported their surprise to Eiteman and Guthrie at marginal economists’ rising cost curves, 
explaining that ‘the absorption of fixed expenses would more than offset the added direct expenses 
incurred’.   
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their answers paint an image of the cost structure of the typical firm that is 
very different from the one immortalized in textbooks. 
The overwhelmingly bad news here (for economic theory) is that 
apparently, only 11 percent of GDP is produced under conditions of rising 
marginal cost.’ 
Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013, p. 8) also argue that, since empirical research 
finds that 89-95% of firms have constant marginal cost curves, this leads to falling 
unit costs as volume increases, not increasing unit costs. 
In neoclassical theory firms maximise profits by setting production at the point 
where marginal cost equals marginal revenue (MC=MR). Blinder (Ibid, p 43) Keen 
and other Post Keynesian economists argue that firms use mark-up pricing and 
face falling average costs as output expands. This evidence contradicts most 
economic text books. 
Flat or falling marginal productivity curves are wrong in theory and in practice. 
Figures 3A and 3B show empirical reality. 
Figure 3 A   Real Cost Curves 
 
Source: (Figure 3.7 Lavoie 2014 p.150) Marginal Costs (MC), unit direct costs (UDC) and unit costs (UC) of 
the post-Keynesian firm. FC = full capacity FCth = theoretical full capacity. 
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Figure 3 B    More ‘Post-Keynesian Cost Curves’ 
   
Source: Figure 4.1 Blinder 1988 p. 103. Cost Curves. 
2.6.4 Services versus Manufacturing  
100% of manufactures are tradeable whereas many services are not. You cannot 
export home care, or your local restaurant (though you can sell franchises). 
Thirlwall and Gibson (Ibid,) found that in the 60s and 70s only 20% of services 
were tradable.  
Barsland and Gross (2015, p.10) confirm that two thirds of global trade consist of 
manufactures. They find that for most countries, including the EU, only 5% of 
service output is traded, whereas for manufacturing the figure is c. 80%. An 
economy which over-concentrates on services is therefore likely to experience 
BOT problems. 
Although over 75% of UK GDP comes from the service sector, in 2016 goods 
accounted for over 55% of UK exports, (ONS, UK trade report Oct. 2017) with 
manufacturing at only c. 10% of GDP accounting for 45% (The Manufacturer. 
Available at: https://www.themanufacturer.com/uk-manufacturing-statistics/).  The 
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goods balance was a negative £135,495m. The UK’s service sector surplus8 
can no longer fully offset the goods deficit, which has persisted since 1982.9  
Returning to the ‘Kaldor-Verdoorn model’, Mills, (1997, 1999, 2003 and 2012), 
argues that a competitive currency is a prerequisite for increasing GDP per head; 
economic growth precedes productivity increases, not vice versa.  This is in line 
with Myrdal (1957) who supposes a path-dependent theory of circular and 
cumulative causation. As per Kaldor and McCombie (1993), Mills argues this 
virtuous circle is driven by export growth. He supports this with empirical 
observation; for example, the Asian Tigers in the 80s and 90s, (and China today), 
had levels of productivity below the UK and the West, and yet they grow fast while 
the west suffers relative deindustrialisation. Economists, says Mills, confuse the 
level of productivity with the level of national competitiveness. The latter is 
determined primarily by the exchange rate which must be adjusted to account 
for whatever level of productivity an economy may have. Productivity can 
increase a firm’s competitiveness in relation to another firm but at the national 
level, if productivity drove growth, countries with higher productivity would always 
grow faster than their competitors. They do not, so it doesn’t. It is growth that 
drives productivity gains; growth is facilitated by profitability which enables further 
investment and also by the learning by doing which occurs in growing economies.  
We deduce that a competitive exchange rate enables manufacturing, exports and 
the whole economy to grow. There is an accounting paradox here. Manufacturers 
strive to replace living labour with machinery to increase competitiveness. Rising 
productivity raises living standards but by lowering costs it simultaneously 
reduces manufacturing as a proportion of GDP. Over time therefore, the 
manufacturing share of GDP declines and the labour share of the manufacturing 
cost base falls, so direct labour is often only 10% to 15% of costs. The reduction 
in manufacturing’s share of GDP is, paradoxically, proof that it is the source of 
rising living standards.  
                                                          
8  In 2016 the service sector surplus of £94661 still left an overall trade deficit of £40834. 
9 Jobs in the service sector tend to be low paid, except for some in the financial sector. Many jobs in light 
industrial manufacturing in the UK are also low paid, because with an overvalued exchange rate some 
firms in this sector only survive by depressing wages. 
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2.6.5 Devaluation, Inflation and the Balance of Payments 
We now test the theory that devaluation can equilibrate the UK BOT, reduce the 
BPC and increase living standards, against empirical evidence. 
The UK’s 31% devaluation in 1931 successfully ended deflation with consumer 
price falls easing from -6% to 0% within two years (Table 5). There followed the 
highest level of job creation and economic growth the UK has ever achieved 
(4.4% p.a. for four years); growth only stalled when sterling appreciated in 1936. 
Table 5 The UK’s Most Successful Devaluation 
 
Ironically, Thirlwall and Gibson (Ibid,) cite four studies proving the UK’s 1967 
devaluation had a positive effect on the BOP (Appendix 4).  
Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983), analyse how exports and imports reacted to 
the three sterling devaluations of 1931, 1949 and 1967. Their conclusion is 
qualified support for devaluation.  
Their analysis of the 1949 devaluation in particular, (Ibid, pp. 151-155.), shows it 
was not rendered ineffectual by inflation and improved the current account. 
Interestingly, services improved more than manufactures. 
Table 6 shows that in 1949 real wages rose after devaluation; retail prices rose 
by a mere 2.9% and fell by .1% to a net change of 2.8% by 1950, when the Korean 
War started. The latter shock explains the 9.7% blip the following year.  
Aggregating the price rises over the three years, we arrive at c. 15% inflation, 
which is half the nominal devaluation. Following the 1967 devaluation inflation fell 
from 4% in 1966 to 2.5% in 1967, before picking up to 4.7% and 5.4% in the two 
following years. Real wages grew after the 1967 devaluation. 
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Table 6  
  UK Devaluations:  RPI, Wage Rate and Real Wage Rate Changes   
 
Source: extracted from Table 6.1 in Mills 1997 p.133. 
Official statistics reveal that some devaluations are not followed by 
commensurate inflation, while after others inflation falls. Observation reveals that 
economic growth invariably improves after devaluations. Table 7 shows inflation 
falling after Finland’s 24% devaluation. Even after Argentina’s 72% devaluation, 
the CPI fell back quickly from 25.9% to 4.4%, before rising to c. 10%, with 
economic growth transformed from a negative 10.9% to a positive 9%. During the 
34% Korean devaluation between 1982 and 1986, economic growth continued, 
inflation fell from 21.3 to 2.8%, before picking up a little, and real wages grew 
by 43% (NBER). 
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Table 7 Consumer Price Inflation & Growth 
 
Table 8 shows that the 10% Japanese devaluation of 2012, designed to kick start 
the economy and end deflation, just managed to turn inflation positive, while in 
Spain, after an 18% devaluation from 1992-94, inflation fell and growth turned 
positive. In the US despite an inflationary blip, the long-term trend from 1982 to 
1992 shows inflation in decline 
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Table 8 Japan, Spain, USA: Devaluations 
 
After the infamous ‘Black Wednesday’ devaluation in 1992, UK inflation fell and 
growth increased (Table 9). This took place in a disinflationary macro 
environment and Ken Clarke’s taxation policy was fairly tight. This may have 
born down on inflation after the devaluation. 
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Table 9  ‘Black/White’ Wednesday 
 
Source: World Bank Open Data: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG; and GDP Growth (annual). Available at:  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG and GDP per capital growth (annual %) 
Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG 
Table 10 shows inflation falling after devaluations in the deflationary 
environment of the early 1990s, with the real wage rising in Finland and the UK. 
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Table 10  Falling Inflation after Devaluation 
 
Table 11 shows inflation quickly abated after the Argentinian 72% devaluation in 
2002. The 50% Icelandic devaluation (2007/09) was followed by only a 6% rise 
in inflation which quickly fell back to pre-devaluation levels. 
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Table 11 Deep Devaluations 
Argentina – 72% 
Devaluation 
against all 
currencies early 
2002 
Year Consumer 
Prices 
     
2000 .9      
2001 -1.1      
2002 25.9      
2003 13.4      
2004 4.4      
2005 9.6      
2006 10.9      
 
Iceland – 50% 
Devaluation 
against all 
currencies 
Year Consumer 
Prices 
Wage 
Rates 
Real 
Wage 
Rates 
GDP 
Change 
Industrial 
Output 
Change 
Unemployment 
Per Cent 
2005 4.0 7.2 3.2 7.5 4.6 2.6 
2006 6.7 9.8 3.1 4.3 8.4 2.9 
2007 5.1 8.6 3.5 5.6 5.2 2.3 
2008 12.7 8.3 -4.4 1.3 7.0 3.0 
2009 12.0 3.6 -8.4 -6.3 -5.9 7.2 
2010 7.1 4.7 -2.4 -4.2  7.6 
2011 4.0      
Source: Table 3.1 Mills, 2012, pp. 43 & 44 
 
Table 12 shows inflation barely moved after the UK’s devaluation after the GFC.  
Following the post Brexit devaluation of 15% against the Euro and 18% against 
the dollar, the UK CPI rose but in part this was due to the 2014/15 fall in 
commodity prices reversing in 2016, (Figure 4). The ONS  
(https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpri
ceinflation/november2017) expects that  the CPI, having risen to 3.1% in 
December 2017,  has peaked. It notes that airfares and computer games were 
contributing factors. However, 2017’s inflation was also caused by other factors 
unrelated to devaluation, including poor harvests and Europe wide cream 
shortages, as chronicled by Davies, P. (2017, pp.18:23). The CPIH, which 
includes owner occupiers’ housing costs, was lower at only 2.8%. 
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Table 12  UK Post GFC Devaluation 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Rising Commodity Prices in 2016 
 
Source: IMF available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/Charts.pdf 
(Accessed 30th November 2017) 
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These results are not confined to advanced economies. Kashif (2013, p.7) 
referring to Pakistan, notes that ‘Stability of the nominal exchange rate may be 
desirable for many reasons, but not because of fears that exchange rate 
fluctuations will impose an inflationary cost on the economy.’ 
As devaluation need not cause inflation it is no surprise that nominal and real 
exchange rates can move in tandem, as occurred in the UK between 1985 and 
2015: 
Figure 5 UK Real and Nominal Effective Exchange Rates 1985-2016 
 
Rodrik (2007, p.16) confirms this: ‘One of the key findings of macro literature is 
that nominal exchange rates and real exchange rates move quite closely 
together. Levy-Yetati and Struzeneggger (2007) have recently shown that 
sterilised intervention10 can and does affect the real exchange rate in the short to 
medium-term’.  Hence inflation need not offset nominal devaluations. 
2.6.6 The UK and the Marshall-Lerner Condition 
Numerous studies have shown that the UK meets the Marshall-Lerner condition. 
Table 13, shows elasticities summing to 1.51, and Table 14 shows an optimistic 
3.05. 
                                                          
10 Governments stabilise the money supply by buying securities to put money in, or selling securities to 
take money out, of the economy. 
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Table 13 Price Elasticities - UK Meets Marshall-Lerner Condition 
 
 
Table 14 IMF 2010 – UK versus German Price Elasticities 
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However, Table 15 shows price elasticities of 0.6 for UK imports, and 1.6 for 
exports, with Crane et al’s own calculations of .38 and 1.31 not summing to 
unity.  Ashcroft correctly observes that in recent decades price elasticity 
estimates have often been too low for devaluation to succeed.  Indeed, as BIS 
(2010) also shows, JP Morgan found that sterling’s near 25% decline since mid-
2007 had only a small impact on trade performance. Although exports rose, 
imports also rose, by a similar percentage starting from a higher base.  
 
Table 15 Long-run Elasticities of industrialised countries through 1994 
 
Source: Table 2 in Crane et al. 2007 p.6 
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Nevertheless, The European Commission, (Ibid, 2010) while estimating that over 
60 per cent of cross-country differences in market share changes were influenced 
by non-price competitiveness, conceded that price competitiveness, measured 
as the real effective exchange rate, could account for c. 36% of the difference in 
the change in export market shares across euro area members.  
Gagnon, (2017) on the other hand, confidently asserts: 
 
‘The Marshall-Lerner condition is that the price elasticity of 
demand for tradables should be sufficiently high that a real depreciation 
leads to an increase in the trade balance. Nearly all econometric 
estimates of trade elasticities satisfy this condition, at least in the long 
run.’ 
 
This conflicting evidence concerning elasticities is resolved in Chapter 3.4. 
 
2.6.7   Governments do influence exchange rates 
Multinational firms are not concerned where their profits are made. They are, for 
example, ‘reluctant to propose anti-dumping lawsuits against China as they have 
Chinese manufacturing facilities of their own’, McKinnon & Schnabl (2014). 
Indeed, 80% of Chinese manufacturing exports are from factories that are wholly 
or part foreign owned (Ibid,2014). 
As advantaged economic agents never conspire in their own demise, government 
is the only agent that can intervene on behalf of the nation state.     
The argument that governments cannot control currency values is usually 
evidenced by failures when governments try to support overvalued currencies, 
with only a finite ability to purchase their own currency. Currency purchase and 
high interest rates cannot continue indefinitely.  
Failure may also occur when countries with large trade surpluses attempt to 
suppress their currency. Countries with capital controls, such as China, can 
succeed for decades but countries fully integrated in financial markets, may not. 
Switzerland runs a large current account surplus and, when it capped the franc, 
accumulated excessive foreign exchange, so its policy of selling francs finally had 
to be abandoned in 2015. The UK’s position is different. It has a persistent deficit. 
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Current international rules may stipulate that Governments should not fix 
exchange rates, but as Rodrik (2007, p.16) asserts ‘with the exception of a 
handful of advanced countries, most governments pursue a variety of policies 
with the explicit goal of affecting the real exchange rate.’   McKinnon and Schnabl 
(2014) confirm this: ‘because other countries choose to peg, or at least smooth 
their exchange rates against the dollar the United States does not have any direct 
exchange policy of its own’.  Korea exemplifies an economy that has been run 
with an exchange rate policy, as Nam and Kim (1999, p.262) make clear: 
‘In macroeconomic management, Korea always has a target for the 
current account that is considered as serious as that of economic growth 
or inflation, particularly when it is in deficit. As preceding analyses 
indicated, the Korean authorities have heavily utilized the exchange rate 
for the purpose of correcting large imbalances in the current account’. 
For countries such as Korea it is taken as a given that: 
‘If, for example, the currency is not fully depreciated to reflect domestic 
inflation over that of the world for tradables, the country would face an 
unsustainable backslide in export competitiveness and a deterioration of 
the trade balance.’ Nam, S-W. and Kim, S-J 1999 p.241. 
Table 16 shows some large Asian devaluations contrasting with the UK’s great 
appreciation.  Korea and Malaysia responded to capital outflows and consequent 
devaluation by maintaining competitive currencies, and thereby accumulating 
foreign reserves to protect themselves from a recurrence.  
Table 16 Asian Devaluations 
 
Source: extracted from Mills 2012, drawing on IFS IMF official statistics. 
Countries aware of the influence of capital flows have stricter policies on asset 
acquisition. Hence China is advised to ‘maintain tight capital controls to avoid 
further hot money flows that threaten exchange rate appreciation … and further 
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upward pressure on property prices’, McKinnon and Schnabl (2014). The UK 
lacks such understanding. Chapter 6 will explain how the UK can ‘control sterling’. 
Economists who argue that sterling should float freely are deluded: an exchange 
rate is a two-sided coin. If China is suppressing its currency, it is propping up 
sterling. The UK is allowing its currency’s value to be determined by 
governments, but not by the UK government. 
 
3.     Further Evaluation of the Arguments  
3.1 The Ossification argument 
The ossification argument implies that the hollowing out of UK industry that 
occurred after the 1979 sterling appreciation, created a ‘leaner fitter’ economy.   
Businesses such as John Mill’s Farlane found they were no longer profitable 
because Chinese imports of similar products sold at retail for less than the UK 
cost price. The ossification implication is that these Chinese imports were 
obsolete, low value-added products, which should necessarily be produced using 
‘cheap labour’ in the emerging economies. Yet clearly these cheap products are 
not obsolete or ossified: they are in strong demand as the composition of western 
trade deficits shows; China provides c. 10% of UK imports, second only to 
Germany (Table 17). 
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Table 17   UK’s Top Sources of Imports + Japan and Korea  
 
Revealingly, the ossification argument acknowledges that exports are price 
elastic. 
3.2. Relative Unit Labour Costs (RULCs) and Leading Sector Inflation 
Do the positive correlations between ULCs and trade surpluses indict the pro-
devaluation case?  
Neoclassical theory assumes that average ULCs and average price indexes can 
be used to assess the competitiveness of an economy.  We hypothesise that the 
UK BOT is related to the prices of its traded goods but that trade surplus countries 
may indeed have appreciating currencies and high ULCs. This ‘Kaldor paradox’ 
is solved by distinguishing between the average ULCs across an economy, and 
the ULCs of those goods that are being internationally traded. This is integral to 
the concept of Leading Sector Inflation. 
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In 1963, Balassa and  Samuelson noted the higher inflation rates of fast growing 
economies.  They realised the rising wages in the tradable goods sector of an 
emerging economy pulled up wages in the non-tradable sector. This causes 
inflation to be higher in faster growing economies. But, provided wages increase 
at a slower rate than productivity, fast growing countries produce more than 
they can consume and achieve current account surpluses, as long as their 
exports are competitively priced. 
Focussing on the competitiveness of the goods being traded resolves the 
paradox. If Germany, for example, produces complex goods that face limited 
competition, these goods can be expensive and have high ULCs relative to other 
goods. However, if no other country can produce goods of similar perceived 
quality more cheaply, then these ‘leading sector’ goods are competitively priced 
and drive up exports. 
Leading sector inflation channels resources into the competitive tradable goods 
sector and pulls up the prices and costs of non-traded goods, thereby raising 
ULCs across the economy. Hence surplus countries can have rising average 
RULCs while deficit countries can have stable or falling RULCs.   
The leading sector varies from country to country. The Pacific Rim countries did 
not start their export-led growth with high-tech complex products. They had less 
capital, and less advanced capital, and exported less complex goods widely 
available from other countries. It was the relative prices of these goods that 
determined the BOT. Witness the arrival in the UK of Hyundai cars in the 1980s. 
They had obsolete technology but were cheap and were one of Korea’s leading 
sector goods.  
An uncompetitive economy with low labour costs and poor capital may have 
ULCs which are too high to compete with another economy which has smarter 
capital and a greater capital to labour ratio. As shown in Chapter 4, with 
overvaluation, the profits required to fund capital deepening and technological 
innovation are not there. Industry falls into relative decline, unemployment rises, 
and labour becomes cheaper. Furthermore, if the lack of capital investment is 
prolonged it can induce a capacity constraint so firms trying to expand may well 
face rising average costs. 
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Table 18 shows the divergence between general prices and export prices. Price 
trends in the consumer sector and export sector diverge and these price 
differentials vary between countries.  The UK’s manufactured export prices were 
rising relative to wholesale prices and slightly less than the consumer prices 
which were less affected by the traded goods sector. While the USA, a country 
also with a BOT problem, shows trends not dissimilar to the UK, competitor 
countries such as Germany, France, Italy and Japan boast relatively lower 
export prices. 
Table 18   Export Prices of Manufactures Diverge from Wholesale and 
Consumer Prices 
Source Table 3.1 in Gould et al. 1981 p.72   
The Japanese ‘economic miracle’ exemplified leading sector inflation and the 
divergence between export prices and general prices, Japan’s domestic price 
inflation being higher than that of its competitors, (Table 19). With the low 
unemployment of a fast-growing economy, firms in less productive sectors are 
obliged to raise wages but unit labour costs in the tradable goods sector, the 
‘leading sector’, remain internationally competitive.  
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Table 19 
 
From this we conclude that the trade balance is as significant or better an 
indicator of economic health than the level of domestic inflation. 
The UK had falling unit labour costs in the 1960s but unit labour costs for traded 
exports and potential exports were uncompetitive. We revisit UK labour costs in 
Chapter 4.3. 
The anti-devaluation case is often allied with the argument that recalcitrant labour 
causes wage push inflation, which raises ULCs and makes an economy 
uncompetitive. The UK car industry was an iconic example; its perpetual crisis 
was attributed to over-powerful unions, unearned wage rises, and occasionally to 
poor management. 
However, studies confirmed UK car industry wages rose more slowly than in other 
industries and more slowly than in competitor nations. Low labour costs were 
backed by poor capital and poor management. We propose a plausible reverse 
chain of causation: worker bellicosity was the result of poor wages caused by an 
uncompetitive currency which reduces profitability necessary for capital 
investment and reasonable wages. 
Another commonly held belief is that Italian post-war inflation was caused by 
devaluation. However, Italian inflation peaked, as Petrini notes (Petrini, F. 1985), 
when Italy had fixed exchange rates in the early 60s, and rose again in the late 
60s when the lire was revalued against the dollar. It was the struggle between 
capital and labour to attain a higher share of GDP that led to inflation, and 
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devaluation was the result.11 In this way, as John Eatwell pointed out in a debate 
at the Judge Business School, in Cambridge in 2015, Italy used devaluation to 
sustain economic growth and a growing manufacturing base despite high levels 
of inflation.  
3.3    Monetarism, Currency Appreciation and Capacity Constraint 
Many supply-siders assert that the monetarist induced UK economic shake-out 
of 1979 to 1981 healed ‘the sick man of Europe’. 
Ashcroft cites Oulten, 1990, who found ‘there had been an improvement in 
productivity compared to the 1970s but not compared to earlier periods.’  He 
attributes plant closures and rising productivity to the shock of the 80-81 
recession and a decline in unionisation. The latter implies competitiveness was 
improved by labour agreeing to lower wages and smarter working practices. 
Logically there must be truth in this argument. However, an analogy illustrates 
the real effect that the 1979 to 1981 60% rise in the REER had on the UK 
economy.   
Charged with growing taller trees in his forest, a woodsman selects all but the 
tallest trees and hacks them down. Statistics then show that the average height 
of the trees has risen dramatically; but the forest has shrunk. Figure 6 illustrates 
the consequences of the currency appreciation, starting from the top left box with 
causation running clockwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 For a thorough analysis of the Italian experience read Petrini, F. 1985. 
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Figure 6 Vicious Spiral12 - Consequences of Overvaluation 
Flow chart showing in clockwise direction the whole process. 
 
 
Cheaper labour may increase short-run profitability but it reduces the need to 
invest in labour saving technology. Conversely, as present-day France 
demonstrates, high labour costs induce increased capital investment which leads 
to greater efficiency and lower unit labour costs. With an uncompetitive currency, 
one can have cheap labour and lower unemployment, or higher wages, a higher 
capital to labour ratio (lower ICOR) but higher unemployment. 
Below we return to Ashcroft’s supply-side hypothesis.  
                                                          
12 Virtuous and vicious spirals do not return to the same starting point, as implied by circles. Economies 
do not return to pre-set states, but arrive at new path dependent states. 
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3.3.2   Lack of capacity and low productivity 
Neoclassical authors see the increased productivity of the 1980s vis a vis the 70s, 
as vindicating Thatcher’s supply-side approach.  Ashcroft (Ibid, p. 207) cites 
Walters (1996) and Minford (1991) who saw fantastic supply-side improvement 
but Darby and Wren Lewis (1989), like Oulten, found that trend manufacturing 
productivity in the 1980s of 2.75%, while above the late seventies, was no higher 
than in the early seventies. 
Ashcroft notes (Ibid, p 386) that the ‘consumer manufacturing sector may have 
been in deficit as early as 1978’. 
Figure 7 (Ibid, p213) illustrates this. 
Figure 7 UK manufacturing and Retail Sales Indices Compared  
 
Source: Graph 2 Chapter 7, Ashcroft 1996, p.213     
Ashcroft concludes:  
‘The reduction in output capacity will assist in the deterioration of the 
balance of payments current account by inhibiting the supply-side potential 
to meet domestic or export growth. … We are able to observe that 
manufacturing production at the start of the 1980s suffered from a set-back 
from which it was not able to recover.’  
He goes on to assert (Ibid, p. 212): 
‘A manufacturing base that had been struggling to maintain output in line 
with retail sales growth in the 1970s (average 98%) finally was unable to 
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maintain the momentum. The comparative deficiency against retail sales 
volume, what we shall call the domestic manufacturing/consumption 
output gap was 20% by the end of the decade.’ 
Thus, Ashcroft admits that the 1979-81 cull following the 60% appreciation of 
sterling, permanently damaged an already structurally weak economy.  
Thirlwall and Gibson attributed the sterling appreciation to the high interest rates 
of monetarist prescription and North Sea Oil; (Ashcroft finds the latter played a 
smaller role (Appendix 5)). They noted (Ibid, p.252) a 38% fall in manufacturing 
investment. We conclude that the overactive coppicing of our supply-side 
woodsman did not result in enough new trees sprouting up to replenish the forest. 
Ashcroft has thus tacitly admitted a currency can be overvalued. He states there 
might be a level of sterling that would cure the trade deficit but insists it would 
involve an unacceptably large rise in inflation that would depress living standards. 
It is contradictory to assert that currency appreciation damages an economy, yet 
simultaneously deny that devaluation can ever offer economic gains. ‘Negative 
evidence’ for the anti-devaluation case is effectively positive evidence for 
devaluation. 
His ‘solution’ is for the government to encourage services to offset an inevitable 
goods’ deficit on the current account. His regressions show that the Marshall-
Lerner condition is not met and that attempts to reflate the economy at above 
what he considers the long-term equilibrium growth rate will cause a decline in 
net exports. The deficit can only be reduced by proportionately suppressing 
domestic demand.   He concludes the UK ‘should tailor any current account deficit 
to whatever level of debt, (i.e. foreign lending on the capital account) that it finds 
acceptable’.  
In 1992, we find that while Mills and Gould regard the post ‘Black Wednesday’ 
rise in UK growth as grist to their mill, Ashcroft attributes it to serendipitous rises 
in world demand coinciding with the devaluation and observes the continuing 
goods deficit: the BOT is not price sensitive, demand-side policies are irrelevant, 
the UK has a structural capacity restraint.  
This remains topical: Elliot, (2017) reiterates that the UK currently has insufficient 
capacity to expand production following the 2016 devaluation.  
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Two questions persist: 
i. Why do supply-siders cite currency appreciation as damaging UK 
industrial capacity but thereafter ignore exchange rates? 
ii. Is structural weakness and/or capacity constraint embedded in the UK’s 
‘economic DNA’?  The rest of the thesis, and Chapter 4.2 in particular,   
address this question. 
3.4 Unwanted devaluations & the non-linearity of price elasticity 
The confusion surrounding price elasticities and the Marshall-Lerner condition will 
now be resolved. 
First is the conundrum of late unwanted devaluations. The UK has always 
regarded a high value for sterling as a badge of honour: Schenk (2010) records 
how all UK Governments resisted devaluation. When forced, they chose the 
minimum necessary, believing that the less devaluation the better, as typified by 
Wilson’s belief ‘there was absolutely no point in devaluation: it would solve 
nothing’ (Ibid, p 171). We infer that whenever the economy finally succumbed 
(especially in 1967 and 1992), the devaluations were too little and too late, 1931 
excepted. 
After long periods of overvaluation manufacturers have lower margins than other 
sectors13 and face a lack of capacity; unsurprisingly, Ashcroft finds UK industrial 
capacity is so diminished that export-led expansion cannot occur without inflation. 
Small and tardy depreciations merely enable companies to restore profitability by 
raising export prices, in domestic currency terms, by the full amount, thereby 
bringing their margins more in line with other sectors. Capacity expansion and 
import substitution do not occur. With insufficient capacity, production can only 
be switched to exports if the government tightens domestic demand to absorb 
the otherwise inflationary impact of increased export demand; this, in the short 
run, reduces domestic consumption. 
If the cost-base for tradable goods is not brought into line with those of its 
competitors, the deficit will continue, precipitating continuing falls in the currency. 
Conversely, a country with an undervalued currency which thereby achieves 
                                                          
13 See Chapter 5.4, item 5 and Tables 43, 44 & 45. 
46 
 
growing exports and import substitution, enters a virtuous spiral of rising 
productivity caused by rising growth. Provided that productivity growth in the 
export sector exceeds nominal currency appreciation, exports remain 
competitive.  
Chapter 4.1 shows how firms trading with a competitive currency have greater 
returned earnings from which to reinvest and thus raise productivity. This thesis 
accepts Ashcroft’s statistics but not his conclusions. If devaluation is too shallow 
and too late, industry continues to struggle. 
Secondly, and this is intrinsic to the above cost-base test, anti-devaluation studies 
overlook one fact that is simple, salient and true: price elasticity is non-linear.  
Observation of an agent’s behaviour can illustrate this, a priori of econometrics: 
if two cars or two mobile phones are equally desirable (of equal prestige, 
reputation, quality, reliability and have equal after sales back-up) and one is 30% 
more expensive than the other, would you switch to it if its price fell by 15%? 
Surely not! 
We observed Ashcroft (Ibid, p 363) holds that for the UK to raise its equilibrium 
growth rate it must ‘first improve the income elasticity of UK exports relative to 
world growth or reduce the domestic income elasticity of imports’.  
 
Overvaluation is the incubus of this problem. The income elasticity of demand for 
imports will inevitably be high, and their price elasticity low, if the UK cost base is 
too high for domestic producers to replace the imports. High price, poor quality 
and lack of capacity, induced by overvaluation, make UK exports price inelastic 
and imports income elastic. For example, as most light manufactures can be 
purchased from China 30% cheaper than they could be produced in the UK, 
(John Mills, 19th Sept. 2017), a devaluation of less than 30% will have a negligible 
effect on reducing UK imports from China or on increasing exports to China.  
Conversely, China’s light industrial manufactures could rise in price by up to 29% 
and still have few western substitutes.  The income elasticities of UK and US 
imports are thus higher than the income elasticities of their exports as found by 
Houthakker, H.S. and Magee, S.P (1969), cited by Ashcroft (1996, p.238), and 
confirmed by Crane, L. Crowley M.A. & Quayyum (2007), (Table 15).  
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Thus, if countries’ cost bases are either very high or very low then prices have 
room to vary without having much effect on trade.  This explains Ashcroft’s 
regressions and those of Aiello et al (2015, p.18): ‘Over the 1990–2012 period, 
we find that China’s exports are price insensitive both in the long run and in the 
short run’ 
3.5 Depth of devaluation and the elasticity conundrum 
Repatriating production involves change; inertia and satisficing slow change. 
Change involves managerial, organisational and disruption costs that must be 
covered. The more complex and embedded the supply chains the greater the 
resistance to change. 
Light manufactures have relatively quicker plant and machinery installation times 
and are therefore a prime candidate for repatriation, provided agents are sure the 
new lower domestic cost base will be sustained. 
Brand loyalty deters customers from switching brands unless they perceive a real 
advantage, so if repatriation involves a switch of brand, a slightly cheaper product 
will not suffice. A significant price saving, combined with costly marketing of the 
newly repatriated product is required.  
Without a sufficiently deep and convincing devaluation, the Marshal-Lerner 
condition is not met.  
Is it reasonable to assume that the deindustrialisation of the west has nothing to 
do with price? Why did Berwin suits transfer production first to Hungary then to 
China)? Their answer, (Davis, E. 2011, pp.102-104) was unequivocal:  price. 
Figure 8 shows that when price elasticity of demand is incorrectly assumed to be 
linear (as in the solid red line), null hypothesis testing indeed shows no proof that 
price affects demand. Reality is depicted by the broken red line, which shows 
price elasticity only rises and the trade balance only improves, when the cost 
base differential has been closed (The composition of the cost base is analysed 
in Chapter 4). Until this tipping point is reached other countries experiencing 
growth will not import these over priced products, so their income elasticity 
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relative to world income growth is low. For a country with a heavily undervalued 
currency, exports are also price inelastic until the differential is closed. 
In Figure 8, to allow for brand loyalty and supply chain stickiness the exchange 
rate must fall below the X-M axis.  
Figure   8     The Price Elasticity Tipping Point  
Fictional Assumption: Red line: price elasticity is linear  
  Reality: Broken red line: price-elasticity is non-linear 
Exchange rate movements and consequent shifts in industrial activity from the 
West to Emerging economies and also between Asian economies in the last 
three decades, are proof of the high price elasticity of demand for exports and 
imports: ‘Because of yen appreciation, production shifted from high cost Japan 
to create boom conditions in other East Asian countries’ (McKinnon & Schnabl 
2014, p.9, citing Kwan 2001, and McKinnon & Schnabl 2003).  
The contrasting fortunes of Peugeot and VW evidence how price sensitivity can 
determine trading fortunes. In the early 2000s, VW, realising it could not afford 
the high costs of its German plants, concentrated on using them mainly for the 
higher mark-up brand of Audi; it got the unions to agree to lower hourly wages 
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and expanded its plants in Asia at a faster rate than Peugeot. VW flourished; 
Peugeot did not14. 
We conclude that trade is price sensitive and that deep and sustained exchange 
rate movements drive capital investment from overvalued to undervalued 
currency economies. Deep under or overvaluation can cause exceptionally low 
price elasticity of demand.  From all the above, we derive that income elasticity 
trumping price elasticity for traded goods is symptomatic of heavily misaligned 
currencies, as recorded in Chapter 5.4, item 7. 
3.6 Why devaluation needn’t cause inflation 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is an empirically established fact that 
devaluation in an industrialised economy need not cause much if any inflation: 
‘Large devaluations are generally associated with large declines in the real 
exchange rate (RER), (Burstein, A., Eichenbaum, M. and Rebelo, S. 2005)’.  
Exchange Rate Pass-through (ERPT) to the CPI is incomplete in part because 
devaluation only affects imports, be these completed goods or imported inputs. 
Following years of manufacturing decline the total average import content of the 
UK CPI is, c. 35%. Thus a 20% devaluation would add a maximum of .2*.35 = 
7% to the CPI, ceteris paribus.    Pass-through to domestic prices (CPI) is defined 
as Broad Pass-through (Frankel, Parsley and Wei, 2011) while pass through to 
imports at the dock is Narrow Pass-through.  
However, there are four factors which can further reduce ERPT. These are 
margin cutting, flight from quality, increasing productivity and the government’s 
fiscal and monetary policy.  
3.6.1 Cutting Margins 
Both foreign and domestic producers and distributors can adjust their margins, 
thereby reducing ERPT.  Campa and Goldberg (Ibid,) found distribution costs to 
be from 30% to 50% of retail price across the OECD and about 49% for the UK. 
Of this, transport is usually less than 10%, heavy goods and ores excepted.  
Distributors (Wholesaler-Retailer, both domestic and foreign) therefore have 
                                                          
14 See Rosemain, M. et al 2012  
50 
 
considerable influence on price. The greater their margins15, the more agents can 
reduce ERPT by varying their margins.16    
The higher the import content of a good the higher the ERPT, ceteris paribus. 
Tradables tend to have higher import content than non-tradables. While some 
non-tradables (such as haircuts) may have very little import content, many non-
tradables have imported inputs. For the UK in 1995, Campa and Goldberg (Ibid,) 
found that both tradables and consumption goods contain 34% imported inputs. 
17  
Dornbusch (1987) confirms that the higher the market share of foreign inputs in 
local distribution, the higher the rate of Broad ERPT.  
It follows that the higher the rate of non-tradables in the CPI basket, then the 
lower Broad ERPT, and vice-versa, ceteris paribus. 
For the UK, between 1970 and 2005, Campa and Goldberg (Ibid,) found non-
tradables accounted for a high 66% of the CPI, tradables 23% and imports 11%. 
Faced with rising import prices, foreign producers and foreign and domestic 
distributors have numerous motives to hold prices constant by reducing their 
margins. These include fulfilling existing contractual obligations, the desire to stay 
in business, maintaining good customer relationships, increasing profitability, 
maintaining or increasing market share and gaining advantage over competitors.  
These are not mutually exclusive options. For example, even if we assume 
conventional monopolistic competition, firms may reduce their margins or even 
run at a loss for a while to stay in business or drive competitors out of business. 
Blinder (Ibid, p.95) lists the reasons firms gave for resisting price movements and 
concludes that over two thirds of companies have either direct contracts fixing 
                                                          
15 Margins are calculated thus: Distribution Margin = Retail Price – Producer’s Price/Retail Price. 
 
16 Campa and Goldberg (Ibid,) estimated distribution margins for the UK in 1995 as: Household 
consumption: 48.69%, Fixed capital: 7.19%, Exports:13.67%. 
17 In the 1960s imported inputs were much lower, down in the mid-twenties. This reflects the ongoing 
relative decline of the UK’s manufacturing sector. 
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prices or implicit understanding, with over 90% of sales being repeat business.  
As Table 20 shows firms do not want to antagonise customers. 
Table 20 Reasons for Price Stickiness 
 
Source: (Table 4.2, Blinder, 1988 p.95.) 
Six factors influence the extent of margin adjustment. They are the degree of 
competition, product differentiation, trade barriers, local currency pricing, inflation 
rates, and client relationships. Appendix 6 summarises these processes. 
ERPT is also affected by whether agents perceive devaluation as permanent.  
Froot and Kemperer (1988, p.3), Taylor (2000, p.1397) and Krugman (1989, pp. 
22:23) found that when exchange rate fluctuations are frequent and perceived as 
temporary, importers and their foreign suppliers are more likely to adjust margins 
and maintain market share. Alternatively, we surmise, importers threatened by 
import substitution who cannot cut their margins, may fold or be taken over. This 
may produce economies of scale for those remaining, bearing down on prices. 
However, with ‘temporary depreciations’ domestic firms do not invest and 
increase production to facilitate import substitution or increase exports, as they 
expect the currency to appreciate again. 
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Campa and Goldberg (Ibid,) estimate that across the OECD on average a 1% 
depreciation affects a 0 .47% decrease in margins. 
Usually, when currencies depreciate, distributors reduce their margins while 
domestic manufacturers increase their margins or expand production and 
increase market share. Currency appreciation induces the reverse; Gagnon 
(2004) sums it up: 
‘Large exchange rate movements can coincide with stable consumer 
prices because firms in affected sectors absorb large changes in their 
profit margins. In UK after 1992 UK manufacturers increased operating 
surplus while distributors suffered significant decline in operating surplus. 
After 1996 the reverse happened.’ 
Gagnon, (Ibid,) finds that for twenty industrial countries long-run Broad-
ERPT for the entire sample period is 0.23. Thus, on average, 1% 
depreciation causes 0.23% rise in consumer prices in the long-run.18  
In recent decades, previously low pass-through coefficients have been falling 
further. On average, Narrow-ERPT has been assessed using aggregate data as 
.5.  and Broad-ERPT may be .1.  For the UK, Campa and Goldberg (2005) even 
found it to have the ‘wrong sign’, a negative .11 (although this was not 
statistically significant). 
Kashif, (2013) finds that even in an emerging economy such as Pakistan, ERPT 
is low. He finds that ‘a one percent increase in price level of imports … results in 
0.15 percent increase in CPI’. His regressions show that inflation is not a good 
determinant of the REER. (Appendix 8 contains his diagram of ERPT factors and 
chain of causation). 
In conclusion, short-run margins are reduced following depreciation while in the 
long-run, depreciations perceived as permanent enable repatriation and import 
substitution. This is consistent with the ‘j curve effect,’ which promises 
improvement in the BOP but only after an initial set back. 
 
                                                          
18 Pass-through varies from near zero in Sweden to 0.52 in Greece (Ibid, p323). 
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3.6.2 Flight from quality 
The second factor that reduces Broad-ERPT is Flight from Quality (Burstein, 
Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2002). This is substitution towards inferior goods, when 
consumers switch from higher quality foreign goods to cheaper domestic 
substitutes. 19 
This figures strongly in Burstein et al’s (Ibid,) model (Appendix 7) explaining how 
the 42.2% Korean devaluation of 1996-98 was followed by the CPI rate of less 
than 7%.         
We now turn to the third disinflationary factor crucial for successful devaluations. 
3.6.3 Increasing Productivity 
Provided devaluation is seen as permanent and is deep enough to make 
domestic production competitive, import substitution can occur and existing 
exporters can increase production. The result is longer production runs, or new 
plant and machinery producing domestically what used to be imported.  
We saw in the aforementioned post-Keynesian microeconomic analysis that 
rising productivity in manufacturing is facilitated by the falling average costs of 
longer production runs. Gagnon confirms (2004, p.6) that the faster technological 
progress in tradeable goods vis a vis the rest of the economy causes a downward 
drift of trade prices in relation to broader prices. This increase in productivity 
bears down on prices, further reducing ERPT. Mainstream economists accept 
that this can occur post-devaluation if two conditions are met: 
1) Increasing productivity is achieved through the introduction of new 
technology, traditionally embodied in plant and machinery; in recent decades, this 
includes the incorporation of increased computerisation and digital information 
transfer. 
2) The economy is growing below its ‘equilibrium growth rate’ so there is an 
output gap which prevents supply constraints in factors of production either 
causing inflation and/or preventing increased output. 
                                                          
19  Arguably, this reduces living standards, but once the substitution is incorporated into the CPI basket it 
lowers the index. 
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They then predict a return to the ‘equilibrium growth rate’. However, some, such 
as Kaldor and Verdoorn, allow a third possibility: 
3) A boost to manufacturing through exports increases profitability. These 
profits can be invested in plant and machinery which increase capacity and 
reduce ULCs. This virtuous spiral lowers the ICOR and produces a path-driven 
export-led equilibrium growth rate higher than would otherwise be possible.  
For Post-Keynesians however, since firms operate with spare capacity in normal 
times, an economy need not be in recession to benefit when devaluation 
produces a competitive currency. Furthermore, post devaluation, greater profits 
encourage investment and ceteris paribus, enable companies to borrow at lower 
interest rates.  
Figure 9 shows this virtuous spiral. 
Figure 9   Competitive Currency - Virtuous Spiral 
  Start inner top left segment 
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The above virtuous spiral   runs counter to the anti-devaluationist assertion that 
workers cause inflation by demanding higher wages when they see through 
money illusion. The assumption is that devaluation causes inflation which, when 
workers belatedly realise their real wage has fallen, causes them to demand 
higher wages, thus contributing to an inflationary wage push spiral.   In reality, a 
combination of margin cutting, rising productivity and disinflationary fiscal, 
monetary and industrial policy (see below) can contain inflation; inflationary wage 
demands are therefore not forthcoming so the money illusion hypothesis does 
not apply. Any wage demands that are granted are absorbed by rising 
productivity.  
3.6.4 Disinflationary Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
The fourth disinflationary factor is a fiscal and monetary policy to promote growth, 
contain inflation and facilitate the virtuous spiral of Figure 9.  
A pro-growth disinflationary fiscal policy is a reduction in V.A.T. Also 
advantageous is a reduction in payroll taxes; this makes labour costs more 
competitive, thereby encouraging employment and growth. Both of the above tax 
cuts are feasible because when an economy grows fiscal loosening need not 
reduce tax revenue. 
Regarding monetary policy, expectations play a role. Gagnon (2004, p. 332) finds 
that agents expecting monetary authorities to stabilise inflation via a tight 
monetary regime are less inclined to change prices given exchange rate shock. 
Gagnon & Ihrig (2004) show this occurring between 1977 and 2003 as 
Governments and Central Banks bore down on inflation.  
However, lower interest rates, offset by a tighter overall fiscal policy, (excluding 
payroll taxes) can also contain inflation:  UK interest rates add not just to firms’ 
borrowing costs but to the cost of commercial and domestic property. Lower 
interest rates therefore have a disinflationary effect on business overheads, 
borrowing costs and wage costs. If accommodation costs fall, wage earners feel 
less pressured to demand higher wages. And once again, lower interest rates 
can encourage capital investment, increasing productivity and thereby lowering 
inflation, as per Gibson’s paradox, cited by Jackson, A and Dyson, B. (2012, p. 
106). 
56 
 
Finally, as part of an industrial strategy, governments can offer concessionary 
business rates, grants and extra capital allowances to manufacturers. 
To harness the potential of devaluation a proactive mix of fiscal and monetary 
measures can expand the economy, funnel support to production and create a 
less inflationary environment. 
3.7 Conclusion 
From all the above, LOP clearly does not necessarily hold for imports at the dock 
even in the short run. It certainly does not hold for non-tradables, failing by large 
margins. It is now generally accepted that ‘goods markets are less integrated than 
once thought’ (Gagnon. 2004).20  
Finally, a devaluation is a finite event. Once any inflationary blip has passed, the 
devaluation ceases to affect inflation. The theory and empirics of low ERPT do 
not support the anti-devaluation claims. Appendix 10 contains tables 
summarising ERPT statistics. 
The absence of inflation after devaluation occurs because the increase in price 
of imports and imported inputs is fully offset by the disinflationary effects of a 
combination of adjusted margins, increasing output and productivity and 
appropriate fiscal and monetary policy. We agree with Mitchell, (2016) that in line 
with empirical evidence ‘there is insufficient pass-through to derail a full 
employment program based on stimulating domestic demand.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 The reduction of margins is consistent with firms not operating under perfect competition. They price, 
by choosing a mark-up on costs, as noted in 2.6.3.  
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4.   The Arithmetic of Devaluation. How much does the UK need? 
This chapter shows the relationship between the exchange rate and export 
profitability. It then counters further common objections to devaluation. It ends 
with policy recommendations. 
 
4.1   The Cost Base 
The cost base comprises costs incurred at world prices and those incurred in 
domestic currency. For the economy as a whole the import content of UK 
exports, incurred at world prices, in 2014 was 21.9%, lower than China (29.4%) 
and Germany (25.4) (Table 21). This is because of the UK’s emphasis on 
services. 
Table 21 Import content of exports.  Total, % of gross exports, 1995 - 2014 
  
Source: OECD (2017), Import content of exports (indicator). doi: 10.1787/5834f58a-en (Accessed on 29 
November 2017) 
Domestic costs include direct labour, indirect labour and all the non-labour costs, 
such as land, premises, interest charges and taxes. Together these typically sum 
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to 80% of service sector costs. However, for manufactures they are lower; in 
accordance with the experience of John Mills Ltd, and with the sector analysis of 
the ONS (Economic Review, March 2014) for manufacturing they sum from 60% 
to 66% of costs.  
The OECD finds the input-output intermediate import ratio for UK manufactures 
in the mid-2000s was 36% (STAN Input-Output Intermediate Import Ratio, 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BTDIXE).  
Table 22 thus shows materials and capital depreciation costs incurred in world 
prices at between 30% and 46%, varying with currency parities. The remaining 
costs, including profits, are born in local currency. The exchange rate determines 
the value of these costs when measured in non-domestic currency. 
The columns show in broad-brush arithmetic the situation facing firms in four 
economies: one with a currency allowing net trade to sum to zero, in which 
domestic costs for manufactures, in aggregate, are in line with world prices. The 
subsequent columns show the situation for an economy with 25% undervaluation, 
and two more with 25% and 10% overvaluation respectively. Note that countries 
with undervaluation, with strong exports and higher growth, tend to have lower 
raw material costs due to economies of scale and lower imported inputs; 
countries with overvaluation experience the reverse. 
We observe that undervaluation, provided the tipping point has been reached, 
creates export profitability and overvaluation causes lower profitability or losses.  
Provided total imported costs are below 50%, the lower the exchange rate the 
higher the ROR. For example, an economy trading at 25% below parity achieves 
a 28% profit, whereas 25% overvaluation produces a 21% loss. A ten per cent 
overvaluation produces a 7% loss, requiring firms to sell at higher prices and to 
find savings to produce any retained earnings at all.  Such firms wishing to invest 
in supply-side improvements therefore depend entirely on borrowing, and face 
higher borrowing costs because banks are averse to lending at low rates to 
companies with dubious profitability. The vicious circle of low morale, poor human 
capital and industrial strife is likely to set in. 
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Table 22 The Exchange Rate and Profitability for Exporters 
 
Figure 10 confirms the above analysis, showing how between 1987 and 2014 the 
profits of UK non-financial corporations rose and fell inversely with the real 
exchange rate.  
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Figure   10 UK Real Exchange Rate and Profit Margins 
 
Source:  Chart 5 in Has labour lost out to capital?  Smithers 2015 FT Ltd April 1st 2017 Andrew Smithers' 
blog April 1, 2015  by Andrew Smithers. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/316c18af-c6b3-307b-80d5-
22fbad0c39bb.   (Accessed: 12th  October 2017).   
 
4.2 Structural Solutions Require a Competitive Currency 
Better quality products, better training, better sales and marketing, new plant and 
machinery (capital deepening), more research and development and attracting 
the best human capital, all these supply-side remedies cost money. The 
profitability provided by a competitive currency provides this finance; firms have 
retained earnings for investment and their profitability enables them to borrow at 
lower interest rates. This facilitates the ‘Kaldor-Verdoorn virtuous circle (spiral). 
Thus, the BPC and the apparently supply-side problem of too high a marginal 
propensity to import are related to the exchange rate. Overvaluation, therefore, 
severely inhibits supply-side remedies. 
4.3    Rebutting Further Objections to Devaluation 
1)  Currency Wars 
Opponents of devaluation argue other countries would retaliate against a beggar- 
thy-neighbour policy thereby causing a war of competitive devaluations, after 
which no one gains. 
61 
 
This is not the argument being proposed. Devaluation is benign to trading 
partners when implemented by an economy which has a BOT deficit.  
As the experience of Europe during the SNAKE, the ERM and the Euro illustrates, 
when currencies adjust for changes in competitiveness, this promotes growth. 
Conversely, when a country is uncompetitive and suppresses demand to contain 
its trade deficit, it imports less. Overall surplus and deficits must sum to zero 
because every import is someone else’s export, so when a trade deficit country 
reins in demand this has a deflationary impact on the surplus countries too. 
Harvey (2009. P129) notes:  
‘Thus, the operation of our exchange rate system introduces to policy a 
contractionary bias, as those with trade deficits may have an incentive to 
shrink their economies. As their imports fall, so deflation is passed on to 
their trading partners, who may respond in kind.’ 
On the other hand, when differences in competitiveness are addressed by 
currency realignments overall deflationary impacts are reduced:  
Table 23 Locking Currencies Slows Growth 
 
Overall Eurozone growth contracted when the economies locked their currencies 
and expanded when their currencies floated. If the world economy is a convoy, 
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the potential speed of faster vehicles is restricted by the sluggards: the convey is 
only as fast as its slowest member. Exchange rate realignment allows weaker 
economies to release the deflationary brakes thereby helping themselves and 
the growth of their competitor trading partners. This is consistent with Rodrik 
(2007) who finds that undervaluation promotes economic growth in the countries 
concerned but that trade imbalances inhibit growth globally. 
The ‘retaliation objection’ is thus theoretically flawed; it also empirically 
unfounded: Japan deliberately depreciated the yen against the dollar by a third 
between the beginning of 2013 and the start of 2015 and faced no retaliation; the 
UK accounts for a mere 2.7% of world trade and would not be trying to achieve 
an anti-social export surplus. 
Keynes proposed a solution (called BANCOR) for combining differing productivity 
levels with mutually advantageous trade. BANCOR would have imposed fines on 
surplus countries.21  Unfortunately, the USA, then a creditor nation, rejected 
Bancor. The ensuing Bretton Woods system allowed revaluation and devaluation 
but the onus fell on the deficit countries to deflate. 
In 1972, the inflationary shock precipitated by the USA’s overspending coupled 
with the leap in oil prices, paved the way for the monetarists, under Friedman, to 
argue for the use of money supply targets to control inflation leaving exchange 
rates to float. The expectation was that floating exchange rates would return 
international trade to balance, yet, before the demise of Bretton Woods, 
Friedman, as Hanke (2008, pp. 275:284) explains, had qualified his expectations 
that floating exchange rates would resolve BOP problems. 
Indeed, under floating exchange rates, the aim of inflation targeting has 
overridden exchange adjustment, allowing the over-weaning power of surplus 
countries to continue. The UK and other advanced economies that have used 
higher interest rates to control inflation, have put upward pressure on their 
exchange rates. Many governments regard a high exchange rate as a tool for 
containing inflation. 
 
                                                          
21 Harvey (Ibid,) and Varoufakis have argued for a similar system today. 
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As Marc Lavoie concludes (2009, p.82): 
‘There exists a deflationary bias in an open economy framework; countries 
with an external surplus are never constrained into pursuing the 
expansionary policies that would compensate for the restrictive policies 
put in place by countries with external deficits’.  
2)     The Cheap Labour objection 
As noted in Chapter 3.2, the UK’s relative decline and overvalued exchange rate 
has sometimes been attributed to high labour costs, implying competitiveness 
should be restored by wage suppression.  It is important to recognise that cheap 
labour costs per hour do not of themselves make an economy competitive. UK 
labour costs are relatively low (Table 24), and many countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are cheaper still, below China or Vietnam. 
Table 24   Manufacturing Labour Costs 
Source: Chart 1 Hourly Manufacturing Costs in U$ 2011 BLS US Department of Labor Available at 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf (Accessed 29th November 2017 
It is the labour costs of traded goods, adjusted for productivity, i.e. relative unit 
labour costs, which are the better metric, to which we must add transport and 
distribution infrastructure, property rights and the rule of law. Once these are 
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factored in, the exchange rate determines whether the resulting cost base is 
competitive. 
As Table 24 and 25 indicate, high labour costs are not the cause of the UK’s 
decline.  
Table 25 Labour costs per hour worked in euros in different sectors 2015 
Country Private 
Sector 
Rank 
in 
EU 
 Public 
Services 
Rank 
in EU 
Manufacturing Rank 
in Eu 
Denmark 43.0 1 43.6 1 42.4 2 
France 35.7 5 35.6 5 37.0 5 
Netherlands 33.3 7 32.6 6 34.8 8 
Germany 32.7 8 29.9 9 38.0 4 
UK 29.1 10 29.0 10 28.3 11 
Poland 8.4 23 8.5 23 7.7 22 
Hungary 8.1 24 8.3 24 7.6 23 
 Table 1: Labour costs per hour worked in euros by kind of economic activity in 
2015 Herzog-Stein et al (2016, p. 8) 
As in the 1960s, UK RULCs are not overly high.  
High labour costs have been blamed for the West’s failure to compete against 
emerging economies.  This implies that the labour share in emerging economies 
is lower than in the west.  Indeed, low labour costs in the emerging economies 
have been proposed as exerting downward pressure on wages causing a decline 
in the labour share in western countries, as cited by the ILO (2015): 
‘Studies typically also find smaller negative effects of globalization on the 
labour share in high-income countries, possibly due to the intensification 
of competition and the entry of labour-abundant countries into the global 
economy which may have worked as a wage-moderating factor (ILO, 
2008). It is also possible that redistribution from labour to capital has 
occurred through offshoring or the so-called ‘threat effects’ that can occur 
even without actual changes in production locations (Epstein and Burke, 
2001)’. 
But is the western labour share still too high to enable the West to compete?  
Labour share figures must be adjusted first for capital taxation and capital 
replacement, which should be deducted from capital income, and secondly, for 
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self-employment, which is higher in emerging economies than in advanced 
countries.22  As stated (ILO 2015, p.14): ‘Once labour shares are adjusted for 
self-employment, it is not obviously the case anymore that labour shares 
are lower in poorer countries (Gollin, 2002; Guerriero, 2012)’. 
Figure 11 shows the unadjusted Chinese labour share (which underestimates 
labour share) fell from 64% in 1992 to 47% in 2008, a 16% fall.  
Figure 11 Chinese Unadjusted Labour Share 1992-1998
 
Table 26 shows unadjusted labour share in ten advanced economies falling, but 
to a higher level than in China. The US and UK shares fell by 4% and 5% 
respectively between 1970 and 2007. At 60% the UK is below Denmark and 
Sweden but above Germany and France.  While different starting dates obscure 
a precise comparison, the fall in the Chinese labour share was only 11% more 
than the fall in the UK’s (16% less 5%), yet the Chinese REER fell by 60%. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Note that post GFC in the UK, self-employment is on the increase and correlates with rising inequality 
and falling median wages.  
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Table 26      OECD falling wage shares  
 
 
As noted, it is more realistic to use adjusted figures. Taking Guerriero’s preferred 
metric of LS4 (Table 27) it appears the differential between Chinese and Western 
Labour Share lies between 4% and 8%.   
Table 27 
  
Source: Extracted from Appendix E in Guerriero, 2012, pp. 31:33 
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A maximum 8% differential cannot account for the huge difference between the 
Chinese and Western cost base which, as we witness later in Chapter 6, is at 
least 30%. 
Figure 12 shows the nominal depreciation of the yuan against the dollar. 
Comparing China and the UK ,  Figures 12 and 13 confirm that the REER moves 
with the nominal rate.  From all the above we derive that  that it is the exchange 
rate, not wage repression, that substantially accounts for the cost base 
differentials between countries.   
Figure 12 China, Germany, UK - Nominal Exchange Rate (LCUs to dollar) 
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Figure 13 REER correlates with Nominal Exchange Rate  
REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate 2010=100) 
 
Figure Source: World Bank Open Data, Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PX.REX.REER?locations=CN-GB-DE.  
(Accessed 08 October 2017). 
 
Figure 14 shows why UK industry can no longer compete. The UK’s REER has 
increased and China’s decreased, creating the large cost base differential.  
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Figure 14 Chinese Devaluation Against Sterling 
 
Source: (Mills (2017 p.17) China versus UK Chained effective Exchange Rate) 
Table 28 also shows that for China domestic inflation was higher than in the west, 
demonstrating again that it was the nominal exchange rate that drove down the 
REER:  
Table 28 High Levels of Chinese inflation  
China 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Inflation       7.2 18.7 18.3 
China 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Inflation 3.1 3.5 6.3 14.6 24.2 16.9 8.3 2.8 -0.8 
Source: IMF Dataset: IFS, Consumer Price Index. All items. Percentage change. 
Previous period. Percent. Available at: http://data.imf.org/?sk=4C514D48-B6BA-
49ED-8AB9-52B0C1A0179B&sId=1393552803658 (Accessed 07the December 
2017) 
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3)   Internal rather than external devaluation 
The UK’s decline is not attributable high labour costs per hour, but to RULCs of 
its tradable goods sector, determined by the exchange rate. The anti-devaluation 
case may seek to address this through wage repression, often referred to as 
‘internal devaluation’. Is this an effective way of reducing the price   an economy 
charges the rest of the world for its goods and services?   
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that when the Eurozone crisis struck, 
Greece’s relative unit labour costs for its traded goods were 30% too high. A thirty 
per cent wage cut would shrink the economy and cause massive unemployment 
but it would not reduce the other 40% of costs charged out to the rest of the world 
as itemised in Table 22.  The Greek experience bears this out.  A devaluation, on 
the other hand reduces all these costs and is thus more effective. Furthermore, it 
need not suppress demand or shrink the economy. The internal devaluation 
requires wages not be sticky, which implies a very weak labour force.  An 
external devaluation requires the creditor class, rather than the labour 
force, to shoulder the burden. It is ultimately therefore a political decision.      
We return to this matter in Chapter 5.3. 
4)   The UK should not do low-tech 
This objection continues the cheap labour argument, the leit-motif being that with 
higher labour costs the west should leave low-tech to ‘the poor’ and concentrate 
on high-value added high-tech industry. 
Thus, it is argued, the UK and the GIPS (Greece, Italy, Portugal & Spain) need 
structural change to achieve this goal. While Germany doubtlessly excels at 
complex manufacturing, observation reveals two salient but oft ignored points: 
First, Germany and other high-tech countries have taken decades of endogenous 
learning-by-doing, to achieve their expertise; secondly, even for Germany, only a 
minority (32%) of its exports are complex manufactures; 60% are medium or low- 
tech. High-tech manufactures always form a minority of exports not just in the UK 
(Table 29) but in our more successful competitors too, (Table 30). 
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Table 29   UK Export Composition  
 
Source: Tables 9 & 10 Ashcroft, 1992 p.301 
Ashcroft noted (1992, p.304): ‘It is apparent that the UK experienced a continuous 
and deteriorating deficit in the low technology sector. 
‘One of the main reasons put forward (to explain the UK’s export failure) is that 
exporting is less profitable than selling at home so when total demand (home and 
export) exceeds the maximum output, the preference is given to home sales.’  
(Ibid, p.341).  
This is inevitably true when overvaluation reduces or obliterates export 
profitability. 
Table 30 shows that in 2015 countries with a larger manufacturing sector have a 
better spread of export manufactures but nevertheless High-Tech are in the 
minority. Germany, whose manufacturing exports amount to c. 37% of GDP, 
boasts only c. 7% from the high-tech sector, the remaining 30% coming from 
medium-high to low.  
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Table 30 (for 2015) 
 
The path for countries to achieve a trade balance is not to attempt a heroic leap 
from a medium and low- tech to a high-tech economy, but to start from where 
they are and build their expertise: China started with light manufacturing and, with 
its exchange rate suppressed, is using its high ROR to invest its way towards 
greater complexity. Western High-tech industry may presently enjoy protection 
due to intellectual property rights, branding and the necessary decades of 
endogenous learning, but it will not be immune to eastern competition indefinitely.  
5)    Wage-led growth versus devaluation 
A series of econometric studies done by Post-Keynesian economists conclude 
that the European Union as a whole has a wage-led regime (Jump, L. & 
Mendieta-Munoz, I. 2016, and Lavoie, M. & Stockhammer, E., 2013). However, 
attempts to reflate wage-led trade deficit economies such as the UK by increasing 
the wage share will falter because, without an exchange rate policy, too high a 
marginal propensity to import will impose the BPC, as confirmed by Onaran and 
Galanis, (2012, p.32 Table 11.)  Reflation through increased wages is more 
appropriate in the trade surplus countries.  
Post-Keynesians have admitted that an increase in wage-led demand in the 
currently wage-led German regime together with wage increases in the GIPS will 
not on their own suffice and must be accompanied by a fundamental 
improvement in the industrial structure of the GIPs, the heroic leap referred to 
above.  It would be easier for the GIPs to increase their growth if they could 
compete with the ROW in medium and low-tech first. The GIPs 
73 
 
need to devalue: ‘At the same time, of course, the euro is overvalued for the 
periphery’ (Storm and Naastepad, 2014, p. 26). They cannot devalue but the 
break-up of the Euro would induce massive short-term dislocation, hence the 
stalemate.        
5.   Exchange Rate Determination and Overvaluation 
This chapter defines an overvalued currency and explains why it is socially 
damaging and in the long run unsustainable. 
 
Rodrik (2007) gives two metrics for assessing currency valuation, one based on 
price the other on the trade balance:  
1) Definition based on price: 
The exchange rate is set such that goods produced at home are cheap in dollar 
terms (Rodrik 2007, p11), i.e. when the exchange rate is set so that domestic 
goods are cheap in international currency, the domestic currency is undervalued 
and vice versa. 
    2)  Definition based on the external balance:  
An equilibrium exchange rate is one that is estimated to achieve balance of 
payments equilibrium. 
This thesis assumes 1) as the starting point. It then suggests that by empirical 
estimation of the price changes needed to make enough goods internationally 
competitive, one arrives at the exchange rate necessary to achieve a trade 
balance.  
An overvalued exchange rate is one that does not bring the cost base for 
manufactures into line with world prices, leaving an economy with an 
overreliance on invisibles and/or capital account inflows.  
This thesis sees a dependence on invisibles as inhibiting growth, while a 
dependence on capital inflows also inhibits growth and is, in addition,  
unsustainable. Both are detrimental to social cohesion.   
Our definition therefore contains the two positive propositions of slow growth and 
unsustainability, and a normative element, that social cohesion is desirable. 
74 
 
The thesis has shown that services do not achieve the same increases in 
productivity as manufacturing and that manufactures form the majority of trade. 
An economy relying on invisibles to offset a goods deficit therefore experiences 
slower productivity growth, slower increases in living standards and a trade 
deficit. 
An economy that cannot offset a goods deficit with a surplus on invisibles, 
becomes dependent on capital inflows.  We side with Rodrik (2007, p33), who 
quotes Prasad et al (2007) ‘capital inflows appreciate the real exchange rate and 
hurt growth through reduced investment incentive in manufacturing’. 
Historically income flows from UK overseas interests financed the trade deficit; 
this overseas investment created overseas employment; this made overseas 
economies relatively more efficient while leaving UK manufacturing relatively less 
competitive, facilitating its decline.   
Those in higher income deciles enjoy their capital income streams, and may have 
jobs not dependent on international price competitiveness. We surmise that the 
UK financial sector enriches the City, but inflates asset prices and hoarded 
wealth. It induces the inequality chronicled by Piketty but not, in his work, 
attributed to exchange rate imbalances.  As Harvey (Ibid, p.4) aptly notes: 
‘Encouraging business is not equivalent to encouraging social welfare.’ 
Countries such as the UK and USA with highly developed financial markets and 
international currencies, can run trade deficits for decades, all the while losing 
manufacturing competitiveness and social cohesion. 
However, in the very long run, overvaluation is unsustainable for political and 
economic reasons. Politically, as inequality increases, democratic politics breaks 
down; economically, when those providing the capital inflows realise the 
economy is not growing fast enough to pay the required return on their 
investments, the flows will stop; the currency then falls. Hence Gagnon (2006) 
finds a significant correlation between a rising current account deficit to GDP ratio 
preceding deprecation: ‘The current account balance/GDP ratio has a modest but 
statistically significant effect on the estimated probability of a large depreciation.’  
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The next sections flesh-out the argument and suggest the UK’s ability to sustain 
overvaluation may be coming to an end. 
5.1   Trade flows versus capital flows 
Neoclassical theory predicted floating exchange rates would solve balance of 
payments constraint problems because it deemed that trade flows determine the 
supply and demand for currency. Money is neutral, merely oiling the cogs of 
trade. This may apply when an economy has a small financial sector and when it 
has capital controls. For example, this applied to Korea during its catch up with 
the west, so Nam & Kim (1999, p.264) correctly note: 
‘In Korea, however, controls over external capital transactions 
have been fairly extensive, rigorously matching demand with supply in 
such a way as to keep capital transactions largely accommodative. Thus, 
ignoring capital flows in the long-run analysis of exchange rate 
determination should not be too much of a problem for Korea.’ 
 
This emphatically does not apply to UK. As John Harvey shows, (Ibid, 2013. p11) 
in 2005 the average daily value of currency flows was $1.9trillion, enough to 
finance world trade forty times over. Exchange rate models23 which ignore 
money, assume prices respond to ‘fundamentals’ (trade flows), so exchange 
rates move to return trade into balance. The fact that the UK has not had a 
positive trade balance since 1985 proves them wrong.  Capital flows, which drive 
currency values, not only cause short term exchange rate volatility but they can 
be ongoing and thereby create long term path-dependent consequences for 
economies24.  
On 20/09/2017 Mark Carney’s announcement that interest rates might rise, sent 
sterling back up to its immediate post-Brexit value, showing that expectations of 
interest rate movements cause capital flows to move rates, as per Lavoie 2014, 
Chapter 7. Trade flows had nothing to do with this.  
                                                          
23 For example, those of Dornbush and Mundell Flemming, 
24 Mainstream economists acknowledge this in their models, see IMF 2013. 
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5.2   City Hegemony and Government Policy 
A mixture of path-dependent economic, geographic and cultural factors has made 
the UK a magnet for incoming capital.  The City of London as a world financial 
hub, a cosmopolitan culture, the primacy of the English language and the UK time 
zone, these legacies of Empire all conspire to attract capital flows.  
Political stability and the multi-cultural nature of London provide an attractive 
environment for international millionaires whose incoming capital inflates sterling 
and property prices.25 
Government policy adds to the magnetism. First, a monetarist inspired monetary 
policy, designed to suppress inflation, induces higher interest rates that boost 
sterling. Secondly, post 1997 26, flows were inflated by the encouragement of 
foreign acquisition of UK assets; this has resulted in massive portfolio sales, with 
the City taking its fees. 
FDI is the least damaging component of incoming capital. When it adds to 
productive investment in manufacturing, it increases the productivity of the UK 
economy thereby offsetting the impact it has in creating demand for sterling. 
Nevertheless, profits sent overseas adversely impact the balance of payments. 
Finally, the international banks of the City, funnel money into the UK from tax 
havens, (Christensen, J.  2013 The Finance Curse) supporting sterling’s 
overvaluation and contributing to asset inflation and City enrichment mentioned 
above.  Christensen, on inflows, ventures that ‘Overall, a net position of £0.5tn to 
£1tn seems plausible’ (Christensen, email to author, 11 December 2017). 
 
This unique cornucopia of attractors conspires to produce a large capital account 
surplus, sterling overvaluation and a trade deficit. 27 
                                                          
25 A report for the Mayor of London from the LSE and the University of York, found overseas investors 
comprise 13.2% of all property transactions from 2014 to 2016, including one third of new build. 
26 The abolition of the national interest defence when the Competition Authority superseded the 
Monopolies and Mergers commission laid UK industry wide open to foreign takeovers. 
 
27 It is within this context, that we should view the debate between chartists and fundamentalists as to 
what extent exchange rates move according to investors following trends or according to real economic 
indicators relating to the BOT.  
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5.3 Encouraging Appreciation 
We saw above (Footnote 26) how post 1997 the government happily encouraged 
foreign acquisition of UK assets.  When the UK’s invisible surplus was no longer 
sufficient to support sterling the dependence on capital flows increased. After 
sterling’s 22% appreciation in 1996, the UK sold off £6.5b of assets between 
1997 and 2010, including ports, utility companies and even government buildings, 
see Brummer (2013).  For an inauspicious precedent note Lavoie (2014, p.498): 
‘Argentina managed to keep a non-negative balance of payments by privatizing 
public companies and selling them off to foreign investors.’  
After 2010 the net inflow of income from overseas investments turned negative 
(Figure 15). 
Figure 15   UK Primary and Secondary Income Flows turn negative 
 
 
This decline, caused by rising net contributions to the EC and by UK overseas 
assets having been sold off, necessitates further sell-offs. Assuming the assets 
being sold achieve a return of about 3% p.a., each sale has a negative impact on 
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UK income. This is a vicious circle (spiral) par excellence.  The rise in private debt 
induced by the balance of trade deficit caused by overvaluation which produces 
slow or stagnant GDP growth, will reach a tipping point when:  
1) markets note that the UK is growing more slowly than its debt and will thus 
be unable to service it indefinitely. 
2) There is a lack of profitable assets left to sell off. 
This is not to invoke the bond vigilantes a la Krugman. As Modern Monetary 
Theorists correctly point out, an advanced economy with its own currency can 
monetise its debt and honour its cheques. But this is sustainable only for as long 
as foreigners choose to park the proceeds of their own undervaluation in the 
coffers of the trade deficit countries. China excels at this. ‘It finances its trade 
surpluses by building up liquid dollar claims on foreigners – mainly in the form of 
official exchange reserves cumulating to US$3.8 trillion in early 2014’, McKinnon 
and Schnabl (2014, p.12). When creditors decide the UK can no longer service 
the debt, they will withdraw.  
Has a moment of truth arrived? In autumn 2017 unsecured credit card debt is on 
the rise. In October 2017 warning signs belatedly appeared: Bank of New York 
Mellon (Evans-Pritchard, A. 2017, p.1) has said sovereign wealth funds are at 
last getting wary of UK debt.  When the rise in debt stops, economic growth will 
halt.  
Meanwhile, if rising inequality and stagnant median incomes are politically 
acceptable, then sterling is neither undervalued or overvalued. Its value is just 
what it is, but, in the long run, it is unsustainable.  
5.4 Symptoms of an Overvalued Currency 
In addition to a trade deficit, we propose seven symptoms which evidence 
overvaluation:  
1) Loss of world trade; disproportionate shrinking of manufacturing 
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Table 31 The UK’s loss of world trade from 1950 to 2016. 
 
The figures show clearly the relative decline of the UK’s share of world exports 
compared to our competitors, particularly Germany whose share was roughly 
constant.  Note the rise of China with its undervalued currency. 
Table 32 highlights the UK decline between 1980 and 2011, while Tables 33 and 
34, emphasise that the decline began in the 1870s as German manufacturing 
growth enabled it to close on the UK. 
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Table 32   UK Relative Decline of World Trade Merchandise 1980 – 2011 
 
Table 33 (Also appearing as Table 41) 
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Table 34  Relative Shares of World Manufacturing 1830 to 1913 
 1830 1860 1880 1900 1913 
France 5.2 7.9 7.8 6.8 6.1 
Germany 3.5 4.9 8.5 13.2 14.8 
Italy 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 
Russia 5.6 7.0 7.6 8.8 8.2 
UK 13.6 19.9 22.9 18.5 14.8 
USA 2.4 7.2 14.7 23.6 32.0 
Source:  Extracted from Bairoch (1982) Table 10, p294 
Table 35 shows how between 1970 and 2015 western currency overvaluation 
wrought disproportionate losses of world trade and Table 36 correlates this with 
declining western growth.  
Table 35 
 
 Table 36 
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Figure 16 and Table 37 show the higher percentage of GDP devoted to 
manufacturing in the trade surplus countries, and the disproportionate shrinking 
of UK manufacturing, now merely 9.67% of GDP. 
Figure 16 Manufacturing Value Added % of GDP 1996-2016 
 
 
Table 37 Manufacturing Value Added % GDP  
 
Source: Taken from World Bank Open Data.  Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS 
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Inevitably, as productivity improvements in the manufacturing sector reduce its 
costs and therefore its monetary value, it shrinks as a proportion of GDP. But the 
long-term trends show deficit countries such as UK and USA suffer 
disproportionate losses in manufacturing. Rapidly growing and trade surplus 
countries have relatively larger manufacturing sectors. The UK’s decline 
accelerates after 1996 as sterling began to appreciate again, (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 17 
 
2) Trade deficit 
The UK’s historical tendency to have a visible trade deficit is uncontentious, Table 
38.  There was improvement after the 1967 devaluation but also after the 1979 
appreciation which decimated industry from 1979 to 1981. This induced the only 
ever surplus; this was due to North Sea oil and the compression of imports 
caused by recession. 
Note the improvement after 1931, when sterling fell 24% overall and 31% against 
the dollar, and the Exchange Equalisation Account was instructed to keep it at 
that level. It shows the deterioration when sterling appreciated again in 1936/7. 
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Table 38  
  
 
 
Table 39, shows net lending and borrowing across the four sectors of the 
economy. The overall foreign deficit became even more severe between 2013 
and 2015 at c. 5% of GDP. Because the four sectors must sum to zero, unless 
the household or corporate sectors greatly increase their borrowing, public sector 
debt will continue to mirror the BOT deficit. Austerity will shrink the economy, not 
the debt to GDP ratio. ONS figures illustrate this. UK PS net debt (including public 
sector banks) was 30.5% of GDP in 2003, lower than Germany. In 2013 it was 
127% falling to 98.9% in 2015, but rising thereafter to 101% in 2016/7 
(Source:https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/ti
meseries/ruto/pusf) 
Any slow-down in the rate of increase in government debt has only been made 
possible by massive net lending from abroad and, from 2016 to 2017, by falling 
household saving, involving a £30b switch from lending to borrowing. 
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Table 39 
  
 
Source: ONS Net Lending by Sector revised 29/09/2017 (Recon= reconciliation) 
Figures for 2017 show households switching to borrowing £12612 m., enabling 
government debt to fall to c. £37,104 but leaving the BOP deficit still at c. £95 bn. 
(Source: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/datasets/unitedkingdo
meconomicaccountsuktotaleconomy 
    3)  BOP reliant on invisibles or capital account surplus 
In the last three decades the surplus on invisibles has not covered the goods 
deficit, so the UK has relied increasingly on capital flows from asset disposal or 
sale of debt. 
Schenk (2010) did not regard outgoing capital   flows or incoming income streams 
as overly significant. Others disagreed as explained in Appendix 10.    
The historical figures contained in Thirlwall and Gibson (Ibid,), Cairncross and 
Eichengreen (1983) and Schenk (1994) show how these income flows, (and in 
later years the windfall of North Sea oil receipts) balanced the books. 
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Ray’s figures showing investment flows, Table 40, confirm that between 1899 
and 1937 the percentage of UK exports consisting of invisible earnings never fell 
below 35% and from 1913 to 1937 fluctuated between 42% and 45%. 
Table 40 UK Current balance of payments 1899 to 1963 
 
Source: (Table 1 in Ray 1966 p.4) 
The UK’s reliance on invisibles between 1899 and 1945 caused investment in 
manufacturing to lag that of our competitors, leading to the relative weakness of 
the manufacturing sector. In the 1880s the UK’s productivity was already rising 
more slowly than that of Germany, (Table 41). 
Table 41 (Table 33) Economic Growth: UK Falls behind after 1870 
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In the post war era, the UK went a long way to balancing the books by increasing 
visible exports, (Ray, G.F.1966, p4), but there was still a missing residual, (Ibid, 
p4), and this persisted.  
The size of capital flows leaving the UK for the Sterling Area and the Rest of the 
World, as a percentage of GDP, in the 1950s is shown in Table 42. 
Table 42   Capital Flows Leaving the UK
Source: (Abbreviated from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 Schenk 1994, pp. 97-98) 
We reject Shenk’s sanguine attitude to these investment flows and side with 
A.C.L. Day who insisted they weakened UK manufacturing (Schenk 2010 p. 91. 
See Appendix 10). Dawnay (2001, p.3) encapsulates the argument:  
‘And the outflow of capital reduced Britain’s productivity in the long run 
because of its unavailability for British industry, and contributed to a 
lengthy and slow decline in sterling’s value’. 
If, over the decades, there had been a net transfer from overseas to domestic 
investment there could have been a lower REER and greater profitability, creating 
a lower ICOR28. This could have promoted the virtuous spiral of export-led growth 
and a stable currency.  
In the long run a dependency on overseas income streams becomes 
unsustainable, breaking down when they turn negative, illustrated in Figure 15, 
page 77. 
                                                          
28 ICOR, is the Incremental Capital Output ratio; as already noted, the lower it is, the more efficient is 
capital.  
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We conclude that the UK’s capital flow history is a damaging legacy of empire. 
Under the invisibles and capital account surplus criteria, sterling has been 
permanently overvalued. 
4)   Low Rate of Return in Manufacturing versus Competitors 
From 1970 to the industrial cull of 1979-1981, the UK had lower rates of return 
on both equity and capital in the non-financial sector than other OECD 
countries, with an ongoing downward trend, (Table 43). 
Longs periods of overvaluation reduce profitability of industry until eventually 
overvaluation destroys all but the strongest firms, as per the 1979-81 recession. 
Table 43 Low UK ROR  1970–1979    
  
 
Nevertheless, after the post 1979 appreciation, Lee and Sutch (1985, p. 161) 
noted that profits were lower than in the 1960s and 1970s. Table 44 shows the 
UK’s relative inferiority from 1960 to 1982. 
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Table 44 Low ROR of UK Manufacturing 1960–1982  
 
Source Table 1, Chan Lee, J.H. and Sutch, H. 1985 p.8 
5)   Low Manufacturing ROR versus other sectors. 
From 1997 to 2016 gross and net returns for services were permanently much 
higher and less volatile than for manufacturing, indicating that tradable goods are 
more sensitive to world prices than services (Table 45). 
Table 45 Manufacturing ROR much lower than other sectors. 
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The above ONS bulletin notes the upturn in manufacturing profitability following 
the 2016 devaluation. 
6)   Low and falling capital investment. 
Investment depends on the expectation of profitability, which is reduced by 
overvaluation. The UK has consistently failed to invest, especially following the 
GFC, before Brexit (Table 46). Figure 18 plots the long-term trend with the UK 
the laggard. 
The figures flatter to deceive. The ongoing replacement rate for UK capital is 
about 12%, so net new capital formation is below 4% (15.9% less 12%) This 
includes capital outlay on long term infrastructure which has low returns. Given a 
population increase of about 500,000 per year, there is virtually no new net 
investment per capita. Light industry, where a high SRoI is achievable, invests 
little when potential profits are non-existent due to the high UK cost base. What 
growth the UK is achieving, is through population growth, a reduction in 
household saving and increased foreign lending, witnessed in Table 39, page 85. 
Table 46 
 
Source: World Bank Open Data; National Accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files 
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 Figure 18   UK: Lowest Level of Gross Capital Formation 
 
Source: World Bank Open Data; National Accounts data and OECD National 
Accounts data files 
World bank figures (Table 47) confirm that post GFC UK investment at c. 16% is 
below the already low Euro area average of c. 20%, with per capita investment 
reduced by population increases of c. 500,000 p.a.); China, desperate to prop up 
demand after 2009, may have over invested. 
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Table 47    
 
The UK’s growth figures (Table 48) conceal near stagnant growth per capita, 
caused by low investment, especially in manufacturing: 
Table 48 
 
Why has investment stalled? We side with Post-Keynesian observation, as 
expressed by Harvey (2009, p.7) that ‘S (savings) does not represent the stock 
of loanable funds; the latter is a multiple of the former because bank loans create 
money’. Net UK investment per capita is close to zero because investment does 
not depend on savings but on the willingness of banks to lend.  As Harvey notes 
(2010 p. 69) ‘investment (I) is a function of interest rates and the expected rate of 
profit from investment.’ He realises (Ibid, p.7) that interest rates ‘do not affect 
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savings and have only a secondary effect on investment, the primary driver of 
which is the expectation of profit from investment’. 
Following the GFC official interest rates have been low, but real interest rates for 
businesses wishing to invest have not. With overvaluation industry is 
unprofitable29. These two facts together ensure that very little productive net 
investment takes place. 
7)   Income elasticity of demand for imports higher than for exports. 
    This was explained in Chapters 2.66 and 3.4.   
8)   Financial Sector inhibiting Manufacturing. 
Arguably, as chronicled by Mills, (2017, pp. 25-27), by Jackson, A. and Dyson, B. 
(2012, pp. 42-43), and Dawnay (2001), sterling has been overvalued since 1711 
when John Lock insisted the King drive silver back up to 20 shillings to the guinea. 
As Newton predicted, this caused deflation and hampered business. 
Nevertheless in 1711, Newton, as Master of the Mint, fixed sterling to the Gold 
Standard at £3 17sh 6d per ounce.  The result was widespread hardship. To the 
detriment of the UK, this value was held in place until 1932, with exceptions due 
to the Napoleon Wars (1797 to 1819) and First World War (1914 to 1925). Both 
wars required extra money and drove up inflation, yet in 1810 the Banking School 
lost to the Currency School, and sterling was returned to the Gold Standard at 
the 1797 parity. The ensuing poverty induced events that culminated in the 
Peterloo Massacre of 1821.  In 1925 Churchill ignored Keynes and accepted the 
Cunliffe Committee’s recommendation to restore sterling to its pre-war value. 
This made sterling 10% overvalued precipitating the austerity of the 1920s and 
consequent General Strike. The City remained the financial hub of a sterling 
empire protecting overvaluation.30    
Since the 1880s, competitor nations, starting with Germany, built up their 
domestic industries (Tables 32 to 34).  The German Banking Model was designed 
to enable Germany to catch up: finance served industry. It established a culture 
                                                          
29 Light industry, unprotected by brand and acquired ‘learned-by-doing’ expertise, is particularly price-
sensitive. 
30 Mills, an Oxford PPE graduate c. 1961, notes that none of his fellow graduates went into industry. 
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of manufacturing expertise to rival and then exceed that of the UK. The century 
old ascendancy of finance over industry, of accumulated wealth trumping wealth 
creation, is the City’s poisoned chalice to UK industry and, by facilitating illicit 
capital flows from under-developed economies to the UK, to the world’s poor. 
As other countries have industrialised the UK’s share of world trade has inevitably 
declined but the relative decline compared to its OECD competitors is apparent 
as seen in Tables 34 to 36. The money and prestige are in the professions and 
the financial sector31.  The best human capital thus flows to these sectors which 
are less exposed to international trade and have higher returns.  
Today Investment flows to real estate, financial companies and consumer credit, 
which account for over   80% of UK bank lending, with only 15% going to non-
financial businesses, see Figure 19. 
Figure 19   UK Bank Lending 1987 to 2017 
 
Source:  Symthe, E. Positive Money, 2017 
Industrial investment goes overseas and UK blue-collar jobs decline, leading to 
deindustrialisation and inequality.  
                                                          
31 This may contribute to the poor decision making in the manufacturing sector which produced the 
litany of strategic mistakes made by UK industry, chronicled exhaustively by Comfort (2012). The 
increases in productivity achieved by learning through doing, associated with endogenous growth 
theory, will be relatively lower in UK industry 
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When monetary policy tightens to defend an overvalued currency, it increases 
industry’s borrowing costs and therefore its investment costs, reinforcing the lack 
of investment induced by overvaluation, described above under Symptom 6, 
page 90.  
Supply-siders retort that government should counter this by improving 
management and technical skills training. However, ‘alpha graduates’ trained for 
industry will gravitate to finance when the latter is better paid. 
It is true that when BMW, Honda and Nissan invested in the UK they created a 
profitable automobile industry without currency depreciation. But, autos are 
medium to high-tech manufacturing and the learning-by-doing and high levels of 
management expertise (including ‘just-in-time’ production) were acquired over 
decades not in the UK but in Germany and Japan, where competitive currencies 
allowed talent to be financially rewarded in the manufacturing sector. The UK 
neglects indigenous training and imports know-how ‘off the shelf’ without having 
funded it, espousing a free-rider economic model.    
The low prestige and low profitability of manufacturing are part of the imperial 
cultural hysteresis, of which currency overvaluation is the crown of thorns. 
 
6 Policy Prescriptions and Macroeconomic Conclusions. 
Broad Aim: To end the BPC by making manufacturing profitable, thereby 
inducing increased investment in the real economy sourced both from retained 
earnings and bank lending.  
Specific Aims:  
1. Reduce the marginal propensity to import and shed the BPC. 
2. Raise growth to c. 4% p.a. through a sustainable combination of wage- led 
and export-led demand. 
3.  Increase manufacturing from 9.7% to c.15% of GDP.   
4.  Raise gross investment from 16% to 21% of GDP.  (Germany 20%) 
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In 2016 UK exports of semi-finished and finished manufactured goods (ONS 
codes BOPO and BPP respectively32)   were £242.5 bn.  As the benefits of a 
lower pound came through, the first three quarters of 2017 saw an aggregate 
increase of 12.1% (£178,351m to £199,985m)33.  Extending this 12.1% increase 
to the whole year produces manufacturing exports of c. £271.8 bn.  These exports 
contain roughly one third imported inputs (ONS, Economic Review, March 2014).  
 
The UK does not need to have as large a manufacturing sector as Germany (22% 
GDP) because of the surplus on services. With UK GDP at c. £1.9tn, if 
manufacturing rose from 9.7% to 15% of GDP, it would increase from c. 
£188,145m to £290,945m (by c. 55%). If exports increased in line with 
manufacturing they would rise by c. £149bn. The UK BOT would improve by £99 
bn, (2/3 of £149bn.) addressing the trade deficit and BPC. If the import content of 
exports were 40%, the BOT would still improve by c. £89 bn. ceteris paribus. 
 
The deindustrialisation of the west indicates that when cost differentials are 
substantial, industry re-locates. The nonlinearity argument made earlier implies 
that the first policy task is to calculate the cost base differential.  The devaluation 
must bring the potential cost of producing medium and low-tech manufactures in 
the UK into line with world prices. When this cost-base tipping point is reached, 
the higher price elasticities cited in Chapter 2.6.4 will re-emerge. 
 
 
6.1 Calculating Level of Devaluation. 
 
1. As a guide we take China, which, when £1= US$1.3 can produce light 
manufactures 32% cheaper ex-works than would be possible in the UK, 
(JML Limited (email to author, 4 September 2017 15:01).  
 
                                                          
32  (£78,164m plus £164,349m) respectively. Source: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/timeseries/bopo/pnbp  and 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/timeseries/bopp/pnbp )   
33 The first three quarters of 2017 showed a 12% increase in BOPO (£57,761m to £64,984m) and an 
increase in BPP of 11.9% (£120,590m to £135,001m   ).   
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2. Add average shipping costs plus import tariffs of c. 10% (7% freight + av. 
2.2% EU tariffs) so a UK good costing 100p, faces a Chinese good of 75p, 
25% cheaper (68p, plus transport to UK  6.8p (10% cost including 
transport) = 75p). 
3. Differential = 25%.  
4. Assume that to get agents to repatriate, domestic production needs to be 
cheaper still: add 3%. 
5. To repatriate production of light manufactures from China to the UK 
requires a 28% reduction in the REER, as only then would price elasticity 
for these products shift from zero. 
 
6.2 Closing Trade Deficit 
We now use the evidence on price elasticities to calculate whether a 28% 
devaluation would close the trade deficit.  The elasticities cited varied from 1 to 
3. Despite the devaluation passing the tipping point, we assume a conservative 
1% for exports and imports.      
We assume, in line with studies such as Nam King, (2009, p.51), that exports 
start to respond to relative price changes after one year, and allow three years 
for full effects to occur. 
 
1. A 1% devaluation keeps imports the same (1% fall in volume offset by 
a 1% price increase). 
2. Exports increase by 1% (price constant, with 1% increase in volume)  
3. This improves the BOP by 1%. However, ERPT is incomplete, with 
overseas exporters and distributors lowering prices while exporters in 
the UK raise prices; assume that this reduces the effect on the BOT by 
one third. 
4. With a current account deficit of 5% of GDP and exports as 32% of the 
economy, the devaluation required to achieve balanced trade is 
5%/32% times3/2/100times 100 = 23.4%. 
5. This is insufficient to close the cost base differential so we revert to the 
28%.  After the three-year lag this would therefore produce an overall 
trade surplus. The Government could thus allow slightly faster growth 
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which would allow greater consumption and bring the surplus back to 
zero. 
6. The economy rebalances away from services and the financial sector 
towards manufacturing.   
7. If overall net lending to industry is not financed through new borrowing 
the increase in investment requires a shift from consumption, which 
would, ceteris paribus, lower living standards. However, our post-
Keynesian insight on investment rejects the loanable funds model. The 
new investment for manufacturing can start from fresh 
lending/borrowing, ex nihilo, which will serendipitously help to repress 
sterling and, unlike current UK lending which helps to inflate asset 
prices, will not be inflationary as it will flow into real production34.  
Without a balance of payments constraint export demand will 
supplement domestic demand raising growth above the historical trend 
rate of 2.5% to c. 4%.   
These are broad brush aggregate figures. Costs vary depending on how a 
product is brought to market. Some goods have long production runs, are 
relatively homogenous and are suited to container shipping. Smaller lighter goods 
with higher value added are suited for air freight, especially if faster delivery is 
required.  Less homogenous goods, with relatively low capital intensity and 
shorter production runs are better first candidates for repatriation, ceteris paribus.  
For these a lower devaluation would suffice. The UK has a large trade deficit with 
the Eurozone which has a much higher cost base than China but some of this 
trade involves integrated supply chains which are not quickly disrupted. There 
are other countries from whom we import, Vietnam for example, which have 
lower cost bases than China. 
Many factors come in to play, but it seems reasonable to assume that if the UK 
can match the cost base for a swathe of Chinese light manufacturers, UK 
manufacturing will be competitive. 
 
                                                          
34 For calculations on national account aggregates following devaluation see Mills, (2014, pp. 14-15). 
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6.3   Implementation 
Assuming that agents’ expectations drive capital flows, (Harvey 2010 and Lavoie 
2014) and that these support sterling, the government’s statement of intent and 
its policy change must be bold enough to alter agent behaviour. 
The government should implement the following policies 
1) It declares that sterling is overvalued, clearly signalling that it does not 
wish the UK to have a surplus on the capital account, thereby signalling 
the end of an era. 
2) It intervenes in the currency market, selling sterling as necessary. 
3) If market interest rates tend to rise, it runs a tighter fiscal policy and uses 
the Bank of England’s prudential levers to enable it to run lower interest 
rates without risking inflation. 
4) It inhibits foreign purchase of UK companies and UK property. One 
measure should be to reintroduce the National Interest Defence present in 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission until 1999. 
5) It addresses the City’s role in attracting illicit capital into UK tax havens, as 
this arguably sustains overvaluation, while concomitant tax avoidance 
contributes to the UK government deficit. 
6) It could create a sovereign wealth fund to accumulate foreign assets.35 
7) It ensures investment goes to those parts of the economy capable of rapid 
growth, to help bolster consumption despite the ratio of investment to 
consumption increasing.   
6.4   Offsetting inflation 
The leading sector inflation of a growing economy combined with a more 
progressive tax regime, would make an inflation target of c. 3% acceptable. 
As seen in Chapter 3.6 on ERPT, if the import content of the CPI is 35%, a 28% 
depreciation increases potential CPI inflation by 9.8% (28% of 35%), but margin 
cutting lowers this. If foreign suppliers and domestic distributors absorb one third 
of the hike, Broad ERPT reduces the figure to 6.5%. Is this realistic? 
                                                          
35 See appendix 11. 
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Gagnon’s estimate for Broad ERPT in twenty industrial countries was .23, 
meaning 1% devaluation adds .23% to inflation. However, for the UK it was a 
negative .11.  The latest OBR prediction is that despite rising commodity prices 
inflation will peak at 3.1% following the 15% post Brexit devaluation. Assuming 
inflation would have been c.1.5% without devaluation this means that a 1% 
devaluation causes .1% (1.5%/15%) inflation, meaning a 28% devaluation 
produces an extra 2.8% rather than an extra 6.5% inflation. 
Theory and empirical evidence therefore indicate a figure closer to 2.8% than 
6.5%.  
Appropriate monetary and fiscal measures can reduce this further. The 
government should implement: 
1. a cut in VAT on selected goods. 
2. a cut in National Insurance, offset by an increase in income tax on very 
high earners. 
3. a wealth tax and Land Value Tax, to reduce asset price inflation including 
housing costs which can account for up to 50% of spending for those on 
median incomes. 
4. a council-house building programme and controls on mortgage lending. 
The above measures only have to reduce a potential and temporary 4.3% 
inflation rate (1.5% plus 2.8%, or at the unlikely higher end 8% (1.5% plus 6.5%).    
down to the target 3%. After twelve months when the inflationary effect of 
increased import prices has passed through, the CPI is left with the residual 
‘healthy’ leading sector inflation. 
If industrial capacity is lacking, extra supply-side policies must ensure investment 
is forthcoming; progressive tax changes can absorb any excess demand and 
protect those on median incomes and below from falling real wages until the 
economy rebalances. A National Investment Bank should lend to businesses and 
to house builders, which will increase production and be disinflationary.  QE for 
production should be considered, as opposed to existing QE that supports 
creditors and share values, and has little effect on production.  
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Increased investment and greater productivity from new factories and longer 
production runs in existing plant reduce inflation further.  Devaluation lowers the 
marginal propensity to import thereby removing the BPC. Demand rises and 
wage growth exceeds inflation.  
Finally, if, despite all these measures, real wages fall, the government should use 
progressive taxation to alleviate the effect on those in the lower income deciles. 
6.5   Steadying nerves. 
A temporary increase in debt caused by increased government borrowing will 
ensure that the markets do not reinvest in sterling. The government must make 
clear that this is intended but emphasise that it is not running a loose fiscal policy 
in the medium term. This, together with measures to tackle multi-national tax 
evasion36 should calm the markets.   
 
6.6   Macroeconomic Conclusions 
 1)  Government debt, private debt and exchange rate imbalances 
Exchange rate imbalances are exacerbated when advanced economies abandon 
exchange rate policy and allow portfolio flows to dominate the currency 
exchanges, while successful economies pursue some form of financial 
repression, combined with industrial policy and undervalued exchange rates.  
Overvaluation reduces demand thereby exacerbating the need for private and 
public debt. Any economic model that fails to include an exchange rate variable 
is theoretically compromised. Post GFC credit no longer sufficiently supplements 
demand in advanced economies with overvalued currencies; inevitably, global 
unemployment has increased from 6.9% in 2005, to 8.5% in 2011 and was still 
6.2% in 2016 (ILO’s Trends Econometric Models, November 2016). 
2) Devaluation and living standards   
Headline statistics on growth and average wages after devaluation can mislead.  
                                                          
36  The Tax Justice Network has the policies to do this. 
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First, if per capita growth is measured in a common currency, e.g. US$, then 
devaluation lowers this nominal figure. However, people do not shop in dollars: 
the lower nominal GDP does not reflect a commensurate fall in living standards. 
Secondly, the real wage does not adequately measure overall living standards 
as it is the mean wage of those in work. The rising Gini coefficients in the 
neoliberal trickle-down era, skew the mean wage upwards, widening the gap 
between mean and median GDP per head. 
If unemployment rises affecting disproportionately those on lower incomes, then 
the mean wage can rise. Conversely, if unemployment falls following devaluation, 
and the new jobs are skewed to lower incomes, the mean wage can fall. Hence 
some of our post-devaluation figures showed a temporary fall in the real wage. 
But, as the unemployed get jobs, provided wage income exceeds benefits, they 
are better off. Overall, living standards for the majority must rise when the 
economy grows, holding the population constant. 
3) Devaluation:  a necessary but not sufficient condition 
In the current neoliberal framework, floating exchange rates do not address trade 
deficits. Financial flows and asset sell-offs prop up sterling while new net 
investment stagnates. Inflated land/ property prices add to industrial costs.  
Devaluation will not remove the BPC if companies fail to invest, satisfice, or just 
use profits for equity buy outs. The UK financial culture attracts the most driven 
human capital to engage in creating financial rather than industrial products.  The 
ultra-low interest rates substituting for wage demand in economies with 
overvalued currencies induce debt dependency. Overvaluation makes domestic 
investment unprofitable which, coupled with the burden of debt, drives up real 
interest rates.  Tax treatment arguably favours debt rather than equity, and capital 
gains rather than investment. 
We have argued economic growth is path-dependent and outlined policies 
required for a successful UK devaluation.    
When the cost base remains too high after an insufficiently deep devaluation, 
inflation is higher than that which would follow a deeper devaluation. Moreover, 
devaluation fails unless agents realise the devaluation is intended. A CBI report 
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quoted in the Guardian (20th May 2017) illustrates this point: ‘They are also 
concerned that sterling could rise, wiping out the benefit for exporters’.  
We referred to Mark Carney’s remarks this autumn that interest rates may rise 
caused sterling to appreciate.  This illustrates two crucial points:  
1) the folly of having no exchange rate policy.  
2) financial flows, not trade flows, dominate sterling’s value, so capital flows 
and inward portfolio acquisition must be tamed.  
Throughout its history, with the brief exception of the 1931 to 1936 interlude, 
sterling has been overvalued. The City of London and financial hegemony have 
drawn capital flows to the UK, ‘inflating’ sterling and reducing investment in the 
real economy.  Unwanted, shallow and late devaluations have left the UK with a 
lack of manufacturing capacity. We have seen that the low ROR of UK 
manufacturing in the 1960s persists to this day. Even if its productivity were 
higher, the sector is too small to bring overall UK productivity into line with its 
competitors. Eurostat figures for the current replacement costs of capital are 
stark: dividing the value of total manufacturing capital by head of the population, 
reveals a ratio of 7400 euros per person in Germany in 1997, rising by 27% to 
9469 per person in 2015; for the UK it is 4921 euros rising by merely 8.4% to 
5333 per person (authors’ calculations from Eurostat assets per industry, and UN 
population statistics).   Should the UK continue living beyond its means by selling 
off assets while productivity stagnates?  
We surmise devaluation is resisted by the mutual self-interest of a rentier banking 
sector, the creditor class and wealth holders as opposed to wealth creators, who 
invariably recommend internal as opposed to external devaluation. We saw that 
the former creates a deflationary bias, while the latter forces the banks and asset 
holders to cut their losses. Economic policy is shaped by power and politics.  
An economy is like a milking stool. It requires three legs to stand: fiscal policy, 
monetary policy and exchange rate policy. Advanced western economies have 
ignored the exchange rate: deindustrialisation, stagnation and social 
fragmentation are the result. The government must signal a deep enough 
devaluation coupled with appropriate supply-side policies to shift UK economic 
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culture away from the rentier economy towards manufacturing. Only this will halt 
sterling’s long-term decline. 
6.7 Further Work 
In line with the view that mono-causal explanations are flawed, we surmise that 
low labour share, financialisation and the City of London, globalisation and 
exchange rate imbalances are intrinsically linked. There must be a shift in the 
UK’s economic and political culture. Real production and corresponding wage    
demand must drive growth. Money creation for property and existing assets must 
be curbed. Unpayable debt must be written down and tax avoidance and evasion 
halted. Should the private banking sector retain control of money creation? 
Further research, including multi-sectoral analysis, should seek to integrate these 
issues (see Appendix 12).  
 
Circa 21700 words 
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7   Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Table 1 Rising private debt: M4 as a percentage of GDP 1982-2016 
        
 
Source: Bank of England, Millennium of data. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/datasets/millenniumofdata_v3_final.xlsx (Accessed: 
24 August 2017) 
 Figure 1 (Figure 16 in Keen 2017, p.93) 
 
1981 41.6 
 1991 86.7  2001 107.0  2011 145.0 
 
1982 45.8 
 1992 86.2  2002 112.2  2012 137.7 
1983 48.5 
 1993 84.6  2003 116.3  2013 128.2 
1984 53.3 
 1994 84.0  2004 124.4  2014 118.6 
1985 56.6 
 1995 86.5  2005 130.0  2015 115.7 
1986 63.5 
 1996 88.1  2006 141.2  2016 116.4 
1987 68.0 
 1997 90.0  2007 154.0    
1988 75.5 
 1998 92.2  2008 175.2    
1989 82.8 
 1999 96.5  2009 177.9    
1990 86.6 
 2000 102.4  2010 154.6    
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Appendix 2   Devaluation: Conflicting studies cited by Thirlwall and Gibson 
Thirlwall &Gibson argue that devaluation causes inflation and cite studies that 
support their claim, which are referred to below. However, Appendix 4 shows 
they also cite research supporting the contention that devaluation reduced the 
UK trade deficit. 
Devaluation Causes Inflation  
1) On page 173 they quote Harrod (1967b) ‘devaluation is the most potent 
known instrument of domestic price inflation … may counteract any 
relative price advantage conferred.’ They acknowledge that Friedman 
predicted floating exchange rates would correct current account 
imbalances but note his reservation: Friedman (1953) ‘… the inflationary 
repercussions of exchange rate depreciation ….’ 
 
2) London Business School ‘… domestic prices will ultimately rise by the 
extent of the devaluation.’ 
 
 
3) To consolidate their case they refer to Ball, Burns and Laury (1977) LBS, 
explaining that they have three models ‘each of which predicts that, with 
free collective bargaining, wages and prices are likely to rise eventually 
by the full extent of the devaluation.’ 
 
4) They quote Meade (1951) ‘it would be useless to turn to the mechanism 
of variable exchange rates unless there is sufficient flexibility of real 
wage rates.’ 
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Appendix 3    The Non-Price Factors that determine demand for exports  
 
Part A summarises the conclusion of detailed studies on non-price factors 
which have been hypothesised to determine demand for exports.  We 
have divided them into eight categories, and noted the conclusions of the 
studies.  Part B is a more detailed review of these studies. 
Part A 
The non-price factors can be divided into eight categories listed below together 
with the conclusions of the studies. 
(i) &(ii) The market share and geographical argument, that the UK was trying to 
sell products for which demand was weak, or selling into geographical areas 
that had weak demand, was disproved. The UK, by and large, was trying to sell 
the right type of products to the right markets but was doing badly in these 
markets, so the market share or shift share option was rejected (Panic & 
Seward (1966); Barma (1963); Panic & Rajan (1979). Major (1968) for 1954-
1956, attributes a mere 7.8% of the decline to market share).  
 (iii) Poor Products. Studies (details?) found the UK suffered from poor quality 
products or unavailable products, and was inflexible on specifications.  
(iv) & (v) Marketing was poor, delivery was unreliable and or slow. After sales 
service was also poor, (NEDO 1990). 
(vi) & (vii) Industry suffered a slow growth of productive capacity due to a low 
share of GDP invested in productive capacity and R&D. Unit labour costs were 
irrelevant., (Fagerberg). 
(viii) Bad Management was found in five industrial sectors (NEDC 1990). 
Part B More detailed review of the findings of research cited by Thirlwall & 
Gibson on the Non-Price Factors which caused the relative decline of UK 
industry. 
1) Fagerberg 
Fagerberg (1988) looked at fifteen major industrial countries from 1960 – 1983 
in which export shares were made a function of:                  Continued over... 
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Appendix 3 Part B cont … 
1) Relative unit labour costs. 
2) Growth of world trade. 
3) Investment output ratio. 
4) Growth of level of technology (measured by R&D and Patents).  
He finds that for the UK and most other countries changing unit labour costs 
had negligible effects on economic performance. The loss of the UK’s market 
share was due to the slow growth of productive capacity caused by the low 
share of national resources devoted to investment.  So Fagerberg attributes UK 
failure neither to price nor non-price factors but to lack of investment in 
productive capacity and lack of R&D (vi) and (vii).     
2) Market Share 
The market share argument is that the UK was producing products for slow 
growing markets in which world demand was weak whereas UK competitors 
were selling into expanding markets. This is also referred to as the 
unfavourable commodity structure argument. 
a) Panic and Seward 
Complementing Fagerberg, the Panic and Seward (59-64) studies referred to 
on page 313 examine whether the following two non-price factors have caused 
the UK’s long running balance of payments constraint and concomitant slow 
growth rate: 
1) Unfavourable market share. 
2) Poor quality product. 
They dismissed this view because the UK’s export share with both expanding 
and declining markets was found to be the same as for other countries. 
Furthermore, when the UK joined the Common Market it was trading with a 
rapidly expanding market, yet its growth rate in this market was still below par 
vis a vis its competitors. 
Appendix 3 Part B continued over… 
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Appendix 3 Part B continued  
b) Barma (1963) likewise found that the UK experienced ‘a slower increase in 
sales of both fast and slow growing products’.  
c) Panic and Rajan (1979) did an international comparison of the structure of 
trade (55-73) and found that the UK’s disadvantage v France, West Germany 
and Japan did not lie in the broad product structure of her exports but in poor 
relative performance in all markets (p. 313). 
d) Major (1968) looked at sixty-three markets between 1954 and 1966: he 
found that the UK share of world exports fell from 20.9% to 13.1% but that only 
9% of this 7.8% fall was due to the area/commodity composition of trade. The 
major part of the fall was due to falling share in every market, (p. 312). 
Conclusion on Market share/geographical argument: 
So Panic and Seward and Barma reject the Market Share arguments as do 
Panic and Rajan, while Major attributes a very small (7.8%) of the decline to 
wrong markets. The market share or shift share option is therefore rejected. The 
UK, by and large, was trying to sell the right products to the right markets. 
This leaves on the table the issue of product quality. 
 
3) Poor quality product 
Thirlwall and Gibson quote qualitative research that indicates that UK products 
were inferior in terms of quality, design, reliability and suitability to the overseas 
markets concerned and that therefore a fall in price instigated by devaluation 
does not lead to greater orders. 
Appendix 3 Part B continued over … 
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Appendix 3 Part B continued  
On page 357 they quote work by the NEDO which looked at the factors 
affecting export success on an industry by industry basis. The causes for sales 
failure for each sector are given after the colons: 
I. High tech products: delivery and reliability. 
II. Machine tools: unit values lower than imports. 
III. Pumps and valves: technical quality OK, but lack of marketing delivery 
and after sales service. 
IV. Electric motors: bad overseas marketing delivery and after sales. 
V. Electronics poor quality not designed with European market in mind. 
VI. Clothing: designs and fashion out of line with continental preferences, 
quality and design sacrificed to keep price down. 
VII. Car industry: Central Policy Review staff report 1975: poor distribution 
networks, slow delivery, high costs and low productivity under investment 
products not suited to market conditions and requirements. 
(Footnote: While localism and generalisations drawn from a single or limited 
number of experiences lead to confirmation bias the current author can attest to 
number 7 being true: in Sierra Leone, the first thing mechanics used to do with 
UK cars was to remove the thermostats. They caused overheating and were an 
unnecessary cost for the UK car industry. In east Africa, Peugeots took over 
from UK vehicles after independence because their suspension was better 
suited to the rough road surfaces, and they set up a better dealer network. 
Similar evidence exists for the expansion of Volkswagen.  
Point vii) above, indicts the UK car industry for failing on every single front.) 
Inappropriate product quality reduces the potential both for exports and import 
substitution. If domestic products suffer the problems outlined above, then if the 
economy expands imports will rise disproportionately. The NEDC survey of 
1965 report looked at the situation with regard to the UK production of machine 
tools. It found (page 357) similar non-price reasons for the success or failure of 
the UK machine tool industry:  Factors are measured in terms of the percentage 
of times they are attributed as the cause of sales or non-sales: 
Appendix 3 Part B continued over … 
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Appendix 3 Part B continued … 
1) Price 5%. 
2) Technological superiority of imports 30%. 
3) Machine specifications not available in the UK 21%. 
 
4) Quick reliable delivery of imports 20%. 
5) Foreign producers meet special requirements i.e. they are more flexible and 
customer friendly 8%. 
6) Better after sales service 5%.    
Thus, UK producers could not source domestic substitutes due to unavailability 
or inferior quality. 
7) Bad Management. The DG of the NEDO found bad management in five 
industrial sectors (NEDC 1990 p. 358). 
a) Cars b) Clothing and textiles c) Consumer electronics d) Building 
materials e) tourism. 
Conclusion. The NEDO research confirmed (iii) (iv) (v) and (ix) supporting the 
supply side argument and endorsed adoption of the total quality approach to 
management as developed first in Japan (p. 359). Overall:  Post 1960 UK 
industry failed to supply and market enough internationally competitive 
products; Cause: bad management leading to lack of flexibility poor after sales 
service; lack of investment leading to lack of capacity. 
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Appendix 4  1964 Devaluation Reduced the UK Trade Deficit 
 
Thirlwall Gibson cite four studies which are broadly supportive of Devaluation: 
(1) Worswick (1971) estimated the net effect on the balance of trade to +£185m 
over two years and on the invisible account £330m, producing +£510m over two 
years. 
(2) The NIESR (1972) revised this down to a still very positive £425m. 
(3) Artus (1965) for the IMF calculated £940m, by the end of 1971. 
(4) Masera (1974) who investigated the J curve effect decided the figure was 
+£520m up to 1969. 
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Appendix 5   Ashcroft (2014) Review of Sterling Appreciation 1979-1981 
Ashcroft cites a number of studies. Current author’s evaluation in blue. 
(i) Ball and Robertson (1993): there was a lack of need to export in order 
to pay for imports as the revenue from the North Sea Oil made this 
unnecessary 
Supports contention that North Sea Oil props up sterling. 
 
(ii) Ball (1998) noted dual consequences: a combination of foreign 
exchange saved and/or the real resource cost of not having to 
produce the exports of goods and services required. 
Again, foreign exchange not earned via exports but received 
from UK overseas operations, obviating the need for productive 
investment and propping up sterling. 
(iii) Forrysh and Kay (1980): ‘escalating exchange rate had a deleterious 
impact on domestic manufacturing; this was an inevitable 
consequence, as inevitable as sun rising in the east’: 
 This assumes no exchange rate policy is possible. 
 
(iv) Governor of the bank of England disagreed (1980): he advocated 
investing the proceeds of North Sea oil. 
This appears supportive of this thesis. 
 
(v) Niehaus (1981) North Sea Oil not a major factor in sterling 
appreciation: it was caused by monetary contraction 
Niehaus’ view is consistent with sterling being overvalued, but the 
blame is put on monetarism rather than petrocurrency. 
 
(vi) Ball and Robertson (1993), later agreed with Niehaus: appreciation 
result of monetary stance. 
Appendix 5 continued over …  
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Ashcroft and Thirlwall & Gibson argued North Sea Oil revenue was 
misspent. 
Together with the then Governor of the Bank of England they argue that the 
proceeds of North Sea Oil should have been spent on investment to improve 
our productive capacity and help the UK BOP. Instead proceeds were split 
between consumption and overseas investment. This is highly pertinent 
because such a policy would have inhibited the rise of the sterling. It should be 
noted that Norway did indeed invest its oil revenues in national funds and that 
every Norwegian citizen has 1 million Krone to their name (Thursday, 9 Jan 
2014 Reuters reported it amounted to over 1million krone per capita 5.11 trillion 
Krones ($828.66 billion) for a population of c. 5 million) and a currency that is 
lower than it otherwise would have been, ceteris paribus. 
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Appendix 6   Six Factors that Promote Low ERPT 
1. Degree of competition. 
If importers are fearful of substitution of domestically produced products 
following a devaluation, they will reduce their prices to maintain market share. If 
the market were perfectly competitive they would not be able to reduce margins 
without losing money, so the less perfect the degree of competition the greater 
their capacity to lower their mark ups.  
2. Product differentiation: lack of homogeneity of goods, (artificially 
achieved if countries introduce regulations to deliberately prevent substitution to 
protect their home producers). 
3. Trade barriers: cross border friction: non-price- non-tariff barriers (often 
regulatory), tariff barriers and quotas. 
4. Local Currency Pricing (exporters quote their prices in the importer’s 
currency) This is also referred to as Pricing to Market/Price Discrimination. 
Exporters to the local market are wary of high price elasticity of demand 
enabling local substitutes to price them out of the market. They therefore ‘price 
to market’. 
5. Inflation rates: mainstream economists have been keen to show that 
recent lower ERPT is due to the low inflationary expectations of firms in the era 
of Taylor-rule-based inflation targeting and rapid monetary response to curb 
inflation, as per Gagnon and Ihrig (2004). 
6. Client relationship and pre-existing contractual obligations. Low short-
term ERPT will be induced when agents are tied by existing contractual 
obligations or by a desire not to upset customers by passing on sudden price 
increases, as evidenced by Blinder (1988).   
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Appendix 7 
Summary of a Model used by Burstein et al, to explain the very low rate of 
ERPT following a very deep (41.2%) devaluation (Korea 1997-8).  
Like other large depreciations in Asia, the one in 1997/8 was caused by a rapid 
withdrawal of western currency. Governments were forced to replace this 
constraint on demand with seignorage (effectively QE) so the consequent 
depreciation was accompanied by a fall in domestic demand. This can increase 
import substitution in the CPI basket: the flight from quality (See 3.7.3). 
The fall in domestic demand left producers with excess capacity and this 
resulted in a substitution of production from local to export market. This caused 
a rapid improvement in the balance of trade but according to Burstein et al a 
short-term fall in living standards.  
They adopt a four-step analysis: 
1 They start by assuming PPP holds and by taking the price of non-tradeables 
from official statistics; by adding their weight to the CPI this reduces the 
predicted inflation level down to 22.7%, still significantly higher than the actual 
6.6%. 
2 Their second step is to assume retailing requires distribution services, 
consisting of transport costs, wholesale costs and retail costs. They then 
assume that the rate of change in distribution costs equates with the change in 
non-tradable prices. This reduces predicted inflation down to 14.1%. 
3 Their third step is to assume that some goods that are technically tradable are 
in fact sold only to the domestic market. They are not good enough for export. 
The assumption that their prices change in line with non-tradable prices, 
reduces inflation down to 11.3%. 
4 The fourth and final step is to assume that the share of non-tradeables in the 
CPI increases after depreciation, as inferior local goods are purchased instead 
of superior foreign goods. This is the flight from quality already referred to. This 
final step reduced predicted inflation down to c. 6.6% in line with empirical 
reality. 
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Appendix 8 The Relationship Between Exchange Rate and Inflation in 
Pakistan 
by Shagufta Kashif p.4  
 
Kashif, p.7:11 Our empirical analysis does not support the results of Ahmad 
and Ali (1999) that a devaluation has a significant impact on inflation. We 
believe that their results differ from ours because they estimate a model that is 
based on some fairly restrictive assumptions. For example, they believe there is 
a complete exchange pass-through to import prices. This assumption is 
important for their results, but is not supported by recent theoretical models or 
empirical evidence. 
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Appendix 9   Evidence on Exchange Rate Pass Through 
Tables showing ERPT and distribution costs. 
Table A 
Authors/Source Area 
Applicable 
Period Narrow/Border 
pass-through 
Broad/CPI 
pass-through 
Distribution 
Costs % of 
Retail 
Prices 
      
Campa and 
Goldberg 2006 
OECD AV (21) Goods 1970-
2005 
.64 .17 32 to 50 
 UK Goods 
1970-2005 
.46 -.11 48 
      
Gagnon & Ihrig 
2004       
UK 1981 - 2003  .08  
      
Burstein, Neves 
Rebelo 2003    
USA 
 
Argentina 
1992-1997 
1991-1996 
  >40 
 
>60 (70% 
of RPI 
consists of 
non-
tradables 
      
Frankel et al 76 countries 1990-2001 .54 -.68 .29 -.59  
 
Gagnon concludes (2004): ‘Large exchange rate movements can coincide with 
stable consumer prices because firms in affected sectors absorb large changes 
in their profit margins. In UK after 1992 UK manufacturers increased operating 
surplus while distributors suffered significant decline in operating surplus. After 
1996 the reverse happened.’ 
Appendix 9 continued over …  
 
119 
 
Appendix 9 continued …  
Table B 
Campa & Goldberg (2006) ERPT  
ERPT OECD  
To non-tradeables .14 
Home Tradeables .42 
Imports .44 
ERPT UK  
UK import prices .46 
UK CPI -.11 (not significant at 5%) 
UK Distribution costs .48 
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Appendix 10 
Analysis of effect of investment outflow on UK growth and BOP 
Schenk (1994 & 2010) notes the outflow of investment from the UK but argues 
that reducing it would have added less than 2% to UK gross investment ratio. 
This thesis is less sanguine about this, and argues that had the UK invested 
more domestically the ICOR would have been lower and the UK could have 
enjoyed a higher level of growth. 
Schenk (Ibid,) argues that if the capital had been deployed domestically it would 
have raised the UK gross investment ratio from 16.1% to 17.8%, a rise of 1.7%, 
putting the UK on a par with Greece and Denmark but still well below Germany, 
Italy, and Austria and France where it was over 20%. However, Schenk’s 
figures for the ICOR show the UK as having the least efficient capital, with a 
high figure of 6.7, worsened only by Ireland on 13.8. Germany Austria and Italy 
boasted ICORs of below 4.  
Schenk notes that the high rates of return from overseas investment in sterling 
contributed nicely to our balance of payments and that preventing this 
investment and repatriating it would have had a net negative effect on the 
balance of payments due to the inefficiency of UK capital just noted. 
Robert Hall, Director of the Economic Section of the Cabinet, thought capital 
outflows to the sterling area and the rest of the world were a necessary 
condition for supporting the balance of payments in the long run.  Apart from 
producing income streams, Hall believed exports were demand rather than 
supply constrained and urged the expansion of sterling credit to the sterling 
area as this investment would build up non-dollar demand for UK exports. We 
note that this model also reflected the neo-colonial practice of western countries 
providing investment for primary product production which would then supply 
home industry. The UK having added the value by converting primary products 
to secondary or tertiary products would then sell these back to the sterling area 
or the rest of the world.   
Appendix 10 continued over …. 
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Appendix 10 continued …  
However, the Bank of England and Otto Clarke at the Treasury favoured cutting 
back on these capital outflows. Schenk, (Ibid, p.91):  
Economists at the time tended to side with Clarke, for example A.C.L. 
Day stated ‘failing to realize that Britain’s wealth depends primarily on the 
comparative strength of her manufacturing industry, and only secondarily 
on the profits of international banking and merchanting’. 
GDP versus GNI 
Income inflow increases Gross National Income but not Gross Domestic 
Product. If the income is spent on consumption rather than channelled via 
saving into domestic investment, it does not improve domestic productive 
efficiency. Incoming funds offset the trade deficit and thereby keep the domestic 
currency at a higher parity than could otherwise be sustained 
Historically, a further downside was that sterling area loyalty/captive customers 
blunted UK competitiveness. 
Encouraging exports to a ‘semi-captive’ sterling area inhibited long term 
development because the sterling area bought out of custom and practice and 
sterling obligation rather than seeking better value elsewhere.  This, echoing the 
ossification argument, reduced pressure on domestic manufacturing to up its 
game.  With Independence, the Commonwealth gradually weaned itself off 
sterling, and British manufacturers found their products rejected in favour of 
those from western competitors. 
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Appendix 11     A Sovereign Wealth Fund 
As the then Governor of the Bank of England recommended in 1980, the UK 
could have created a sovereign wealth fund from the proceeds of its oil, as 
Norway did, but failed to do this.  
A sovereign wealth fund could now be funded through taxation, perhaps taking 
an obligatory contribution from pension funds or from national insurance 
contributions or from a wealth tax.  This would be controversial and even more 
so would be to use money creation to buy foreign assets. The feasibility of such 
proposals is beyond the scope of this thesis but there is no a priori reason for 
not investigating such possibilities. Quantitative easing or ‘money printing’ was 
considered heretical by many governments and mainstream economists (and 
still is by some), but is now a fact of life. We surmise that previous QE has 
effectively inflated assets and rather than solving the crisis has supported the 
flawed structure of the UK economy. QE for a Sovereign Wealth fund would be 
aimed at correcting the structure of the UK economy. 
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Appendix 12      Further Work 
1. The cost-base differentials between UK and our trading partners could be 
quantified in multi-sectoral GVA analysis.   
2. How and by how much should incoming capital flows be restricted? 
3. While venture capital for start-ups is available in the UK, there is evidence 
that the UK stock market is not supplying the capital needed for 
businesses to grow into global players. The recent loss of ARM to 
overseas purchasers exemplifies this problem. 
4. Are the GDP figures for the UK financial sector fit for purpose? If the 
income of those in real estate is a slice of asset price inflation, caused by 
the banks’ creation of money ex-nihilo37, a portion of the GVA of this sector 
is fictitious. If so, this strengthens the case for manufacturing and new 
technology rather than financial services. 
5. Does financialisation keep markets honest or misallocate capital? Michael 
Hudson states (Ibid, 2015), money is easy but dear, when it should be 
difficult but cheap. Is the financial sector, in part, a rentier sector imposing 
a burden on the economy? Further work on themes explored in the 
Spider’s Web, (John Christensen) must be done, to work out how much 
capital is flowing in to the UK from tax havens and propping up sterling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 As Ryan Collins et al and Haldane of the Bank of England understand, (Collins, 
J.R et al ,2011) money is created ex-nihilo by the banks and the reserves are 
forthcoming ex-post because central banks know that if they fail to make them 
available the whole system will collapse. 
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